InsideOut (Riley) MCP Server
https://app.luthersystems.com/v1/insideout-mcp
Remote
vv2.0.0
Published by app.luthersystems.com — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Designs, prices, and deploys AWS/GCP cloud infrastructure from plain-English requirements.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: awsinspect_batch → tflogs → tfgenerate. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow awsinspect_batch → tflogs → tfgenerate
medium Open-world tool "tflogs" also reads sensitive dataMTC-CAP-004
Tool "tflogs" declares openWorldHint=true — it interacts with entities outside the trust boundary — while also reading sensitive data. That combination is a canonical lethal-trifecta indicator.
Fix: Separate outward-facing tools from sensitive-data reads; require confirmation between them.
Location: tool tflogs
Tools 24
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
tfgenerateingests untrusted inputnetwork egresstflogsingests untrusted inputreads sensitive dataawsinspect_batchingests untrusted inputgcpinspect_batchingests untrusted inputawsinspectno sensitive capabilityconvoawaitno sensitive capabilityconvoinspectno sensitive capabilityconvoopenno sensitive capabilityconvoreplyno sensitive capabilityconvostatusno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
credawaitno sensitive capabilitygcpinspectno sensitive capabilityhelpno sensitive capabilitystackdiffno sensitive capabilitystackrollbackno sensitive capabilitystackversionsno sensitive capabilitysubmit_feedbackno sensitive capabilitytfdeployno sensitive capabilitytfdestroyno sensitive capabilitytfdriftno sensitive capabilitytfoutputsno sensitive capabilitytfplanno sensitive capabilitytfrunsno sensitive capabilitytfstatusno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
vv2.0.0 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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