Apitap Core MCP Server
@apitap/core
npm
v2.2.2
Published by @apitap — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Intercept web API traffic during browsing. Generate portable skill files so AI agents can call APIs directly instead of scraping.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/plugin.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/plugin.js:134`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import('node:child_process'); const { promisify } = await import('node:util'); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/plugin.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/skill/github.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/skill/github.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { resolveAndValidateUrl as _resolveAndValidateUrl } from './ssrf.js'; //
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/skill/github.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/plugin.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/plugin.ts:165`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: } = await import('node:child_process'); const { promisify } = await import('node:util'); const execFileAsyn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/plugin.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/skill/github.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/skill/github.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { resolveAndValidateUrl as _resolveAndValidateUrl } from './ssrf.js'; //
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/skill/github.ts
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "apitap_browse"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "apitap_browse" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool apitap_browse · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 12
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
apitap_browseingests untrusted inputapitap_auth_requestno sensitive capabilityapitap_captureno sensitive capabilityapitap_capture_finishno sensitive capabilityapitap_capture_interactno sensitive capabilityapitap_capture_startno sensitive capabilityapitap_discoverno sensitive capabilityapitap_peekno sensitive capabilityapitap_readno sensitive capabilityapitap_replayno sensitive capability
Show 2 more tools ↓
apitap_replay_batchno sensitive capabilityapitap_searchno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (12 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v2.2.1 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
v2.2.0 |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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