https://api.relmcrm.com/mcp
Remote
v0.17.1
Published by api.relmcrm.com — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
API-first CRM for LLMs - contacts, companies, deals and activities over a native MCP server.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Untrusted-input tools ([relm_get, relm_update]) co-exist with external-action tools ([relm_create_template, relm_create_webhook, relm_list_webhooks, relm_delete_webhook, relm_get_webhook, relm_manage_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [relm_get, relm_update] → sinks [relm_create_template, relm_create_webhook, relm_list_webhooks, relm_delete_webhook, relm_get_webhook, relm_manage_web
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow relm_get → relm_create_template
Tool "relm_create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool relm_create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
relm_create_templatenetwork egressrelm_create_webhooknetwork egressrelm_delete_webhooknetwork egressrelm_getingests untrusted inputrelm_get_webhooknetwork egressrelm_list_webhooksnetwork egressrelm_manage_webhooknetwork egressrelm_updateingests untrusted inputrelm_automations_capabilitiesno sensitive capabilityrelm_batchno sensitive capabilityrelm_connect_channelno sensitive capabilityrelm_createno sensitive capabilityrelm_create_automationno sensitive capabilityrelm_create_enum_valueno sensitive capabilityrelm_create_fieldno sensitive capabilityrelm_create_pipelineno sensitive capabilityrelm_create_sequenceno sensitive capabilityrelm_create_typeno sensitive capabilityrelm_deleteno sensitive capabilityrelm_delete_connectionno sensitive capabilityrelm_describe_schemano sensitive capabilityrelm_enrollno sensitive capabilityrelm_get_automationno sensitive capabilityrelm_get_pipelineno sensitive capabilityrelm_get_sequenceno sensitive capabilityrelm_get_usageno sensitive capabilityrelm_listno sensitive capabilityrelm_list_automationsno sensitive capabilityrelm_list_connectionsno sensitive capabilityrelm_list_pipelinesno sensitive capabilityrelm_list_sequencesno sensitive capabilityrelm_list_templatesno sensitive capabilityrelm_log_activityno sensitive capabilityrelm_manage_automationno sensitive capabilityrelm_manage_pipelineno sensitive capabilityrelm_manage_sequenceno sensitive capabilityrelm_manage_stageno sensitive capabilityrelm_preview_sequenceno sensitive capabilityrelm_restoreno sensitive capabilityrelm_searchno sensitive capabilityrelm_set_spend_capno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.17.1 latest |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.14.0 | 2026-09-22 |
v0.16.0 |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
v0.13.0 |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
v0.9.1 |
A 97/100 | 2 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan https://api.relmcrm.com/mcp --online
Free public tax reference data — GST/VAT, income, company and capital-gains tax rules for 50+ countries.
The approval gate for unattended UCP buying agents — a policy/approval MCP proxy in front of a merchant's UCP checkout endpoint.
Autotask PSA MCP server. Generic entity query/get/create/update across the full REST API plus convenience tools for tickets, companies, contacts, projects, tasks and time entries. AI-safe with readonly mode and destructive-action confirmation. stdio + opt
MCP server for B2C Commerce developer experience tools
Search, compare and contact real-world companies through a public MCP business directory.
Norwegian business register (Brønnøysundregistrene) as an MCP server — companies, roles, subunits and annual accounts, with the register's silent traps encoded as guards.