https://api.framesail.com/mcp
Remote
v1.27.2
Published by api.framesail.com — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Create long-form YouTube videos end to end: script, storyboard, voiceover, final MP4.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Annotation contradicts behavior on "activate_script_version" MTC-CAP-003 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Tool "activate_script_version" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool activate_script_version
Untrusted-input tools ([get_project, set_character_voice, set_narrator_voice, add_segment_sfx, get_video_url, get_style, browse_audio_library, add_music_track, view_image]) co-exist with external-action tools ([activate_script_version]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_project, set_character_voice, set_narrator_voice, add_segment_sfx, get_video_url, get_style, browse_audio_library, add_music_track, view_image] →
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_project → activate_script_version
Tool "view_image" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool view_image · inputSchema.properties.url
Tool "activate_script_version" advertises destructiveHint=false but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (code-exec). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.
Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.
Location: tool activate_script_version
Tool "activate_script_version" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool activate_script_version · inputSchema.properties.script_id
Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.
activate_script_versionruns code / shelladd_music_trackingests untrusted inputadd_segment_sfxingests untrusted inputbrowse_audio_libraryingests untrusted inputget_projectingests untrusted inputget_styleingests untrusted inputget_video_urlingests untrusted inputset_character_voiceingests untrusted inputset_narrator_voiceingests untrusted inputview_imageingests untrusted inputanalyze_styleno sensitive capabilityanimate_segmentno sensitive capabilityawait_jobsno sensitive capabilitybuild_scenesno sensitive capabilitychange_segment_typeno sensitive capabilitycombine_segmentsno sensitive capabilitycreate_assetno sensitive capabilitycreate_channelno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_styleno sensitive capabilitydelete_assetno sensitive capabilitydelete_projectno sensitive capabilitydelete_styleno sensitive capabilitydirector_noteno sensitive capabilityexport_videono sensitive capabilitygenerate_asset_referenceno sensitive capabilitygenerate_scriptno sensitive capabilitygenerate_segmentsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_storyboardno sensitive capabilitygenerate_style_templateno sensitive capabilitygenerate_voiceoverno sensitive capabilityget_credit_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_progressno sensitive capabilityget_scriptno sensitive capabilityget_section_templateno sensitive capabilityget_segment_assetsno sensitive capabilityget_segmentsno sensitive capabilityget_workflow_statusno sensitive capabilitylist_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_channelsno sensitive capabilitylist_modelsno sensitive capabilitylist_music_tracksno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_provider_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_scenesno sensitive capabilitylist_style_presetsno sensitive capabilitylist_stylesno sensitive capabilitylist_voice_blocksno sensitive capabilitylist_voicesno sensitive capabilityproject_director_noteno sensitive capabilityregenerate_segment_assetno sensitive capabilityremove_music_trackno sensitive capabilityremove_segment_sfxno sensitive capabilityrescan_voice_blocksno sensitive capabilityrevise_scriptno sensitive capabilityrollback_segment_assetno sensitive capabilitysave_scriptno sensitive capabilityscan_scriptno sensitive capabilityset_project_styleno sensitive capabilityset_provider_keyno sensitive capabilityset_segment_continuationno sensitive capabilitysplit_segmentno sensitive capabilityupdate_assetno sensitive capabilityupdate_caption_configno sensitive capabilityupdate_music_trackno sensitive capabilityupdate_projectno sensitive capabilityupdate_segment_contentno sensitive capabilityupdate_segment_promptsno sensitive capabilityupdate_style_fieldsno sensitive capabilityupdate_style_referencesno sensitive capabilityupdate_voice_blockno sensitive capabilitywhoamino sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.27.2 latest |
B 88/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan https://api.framesail.com/mcp --online
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