Framesail MCP Server

https://api.framesail.com/mcp Remote v1.27.2

Published by api.framesail.com — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Create long-form YouTube videos end to end: script, storyboard, voiceover, final MP4.

Trust grade
B
88/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
B · 88/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Live
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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B Why this grade threat 94 − adoption risk = 88/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−6.3 Annotation contradicts behavior on "activate_script_version" MTC-CAP-003 permissions

2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 5

high Tool "activate_script_version" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001

Tool "activate_script_version" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool activate_script_version

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([get_project, set_character_voice, set_narrator_voice, add_segment_sfx, get_video_url, get_style, browse_audio_library, add_music_track, view_image]) co-exist with external-action tools ([activate_script_version]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [get_project, set_character_voice, set_narrator_voice, add_segment_sfx, get_video_url, get_style, browse_audio_library, add_music_track, view_image] →

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow get_project → activate_script_version

medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "view_image"MTC-CAP-007

Tool "view_image" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).

Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.

Location: tool view_image · inputSchema.properties.url

medium Annotation contradicts behavior on "activate_script_version"MTC-CAP-003

Tool "activate_script_version" advertises destructiveHint=false but its derived capabilities include state-modifying actions (code-exec). Tool annotations are attacker-controllable and must never be trusted; a mismatch like this is exactly how a hostile server hides a destructive tool.

Fix: Ignore server-provided annotations for security decisions; gate destructive tools on explicit user consent.

Location: tool activate_script_version

medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_id" on "activate_script_version"MTC-CAP-006

Tool "activate_script_version" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_id" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool activate_script_version · inputSchema.properties.script_id

Tools 72

Each tool and what it can reach — enumerated from the running server.

  • activate_script_versionruns code / shell
  • add_music_trackingests untrusted input
  • add_segment_sfxingests untrusted input
  • browse_audio_libraryingests untrusted input
  • get_projectingests untrusted input
  • get_styleingests untrusted input
  • get_video_urlingests untrusted input
  • set_character_voiceingests untrusted input
  • set_narrator_voiceingests untrusted input
  • view_imageingests untrusted input
Show 62 more tools ↓
  • analyze_styleno sensitive capability
  • animate_segmentno sensitive capability
  • await_jobsno sensitive capability
  • build_scenesno sensitive capability
  • change_segment_typeno sensitive capability
  • combine_segmentsno sensitive capability
  • create_assetno sensitive capability
  • create_channelno sensitive capability
  • create_projectno sensitive capability
  • create_styleno sensitive capability
  • delete_assetno sensitive capability
  • delete_projectno sensitive capability
  • delete_styleno sensitive capability
  • director_noteno sensitive capability
  • export_videono sensitive capability
  • generate_asset_referenceno sensitive capability
  • generate_scriptno sensitive capability
  • generate_segmentsno sensitive capability
  • generate_storyboardno sensitive capability
  • generate_style_templateno sensitive capability
  • generate_voiceoverno sensitive capability
  • get_credit_balanceno sensitive capability
  • get_pipeline_progressno sensitive capability
  • get_scriptno sensitive capability
  • get_section_templateno sensitive capability
  • get_segment_assetsno sensitive capability
  • get_segmentsno sensitive capability
  • get_workflow_statusno sensitive capability
  • list_assetsno sensitive capability
  • list_channelsno sensitive capability
  • list_modelsno sensitive capability
  • list_music_tracksno sensitive capability
  • list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_provider_keysno sensitive capability
  • list_scenesno sensitive capability
  • list_style_presetsno sensitive capability
  • list_stylesno sensitive capability
  • list_voice_blocksno sensitive capability
  • list_voicesno sensitive capability
  • project_director_noteno sensitive capability
  • regenerate_segment_assetno sensitive capability
  • remove_music_trackno sensitive capability
  • remove_segment_sfxno sensitive capability
  • rescan_voice_blocksno sensitive capability
  • revise_scriptno sensitive capability
  • rollback_segment_assetno sensitive capability
  • save_scriptno sensitive capability
  • scan_scriptno sensitive capability
  • set_project_styleno sensitive capability
  • set_provider_keyno sensitive capability
  • set_segment_continuationno sensitive capability
  • split_segmentno sensitive capability
  • update_assetno sensitive capability
  • update_caption_configno sensitive capability
  • update_music_trackno sensitive capability
  • update_projectno sensitive capability
  • update_segment_contentno sensitive capability
  • update_segment_promptsno sensitive capability
  • update_style_fieldsno sensitive capability
  • update_style_referencesno sensitive capability
  • update_voice_blockno sensitive capability
  • whoamino sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.27.2 latest B 88/100 5 1.13.0 2026-09-05

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Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: B · 88/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan https://api.framesail.com/mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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