Discovery — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@anygpt/mcp-discovery-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@anygpt/mcp-discovery-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@anygpt/mcp-discovery-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: list_tools ⇒ search_tools → execute_tool. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "list_tools → search_tools → execute_tool"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"list_tools"
],
"sources": [
"search_tools"
],
"sinks": [
"execute_tool"
],
"path": [
"list_tools",
"search_tools",
"execute_tool"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "list_tools",
"to": "search_tools",
"kind": "schema-wired"
},
{
"from": "search_tools",
"to": "execute_tool",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"list_tools"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"search_tools"
],
"externalSink": [
"execute_tool"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"list_tools",
"search_tools",
"execute_tool"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: list_tools ⇒ search_tools → execute_tool."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_mcp_servers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_tools",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_tools",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"browse\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_tool_details",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_tool",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "refresh_cache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mcp-discovery-usage-guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "MCP Discovery - Complete Usage Guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "MCP Discovery - Quick Reference",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "MCP Discovery - Troubleshooting Guide",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Server Information",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Server Tools List",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "Tool Documentation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "8a507e24c579a82f4a742707a30f3f1b8cc42c6c790f72aabe183f9b5a7144c4",
"stats": {
"tools": 13,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}