Anydb Mcp Service MCP Server
anydb-mcp-service
npm
v3.0.1
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for AnyDB database and record management through AI assistants
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Tool "anydb_run_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "anydb_run_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "run_script" in tool name, parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool anydb_run_script
high Tool "anydb_simulate_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "anydb_simulate_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool anydb_simulate_script
high Tool "anydb_validate_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "anydb_validate_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool anydb_validate_script
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([anydb_generate_document, anydb_get_record_version, anydb_get_record_version_delta, download_file]) co-exist with external-action tools ([anydb_run_script, anydb_simulate_script, anydb_validate_script, upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [anydb_generate_document, anydb_get_record_version, anydb_get_record_version_delta, download_file] → sinks [anydb_run_script, anydb_simulate_script, a
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow anydb_generate_document → anydb_run_script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "anydb_run_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "anydb_run_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool anydb_run_script · inputSchema.properties.script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "anydb_simulate_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "anydb_simulate_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool anydb_simulate_script · inputSchema.properties.script
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "anydb_validate_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "anydb_validate_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool anydb_validate_script · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "anydb_run_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "anydb_run_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool anydb_run_script
low Mutating tool "anydb_simulate_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "anydb_simulate_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool anydb_simulate_script
low Mutating tool "anydb_validate_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "anydb_validate_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool anydb_validate_script
Tools 44
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
anydb_generate_documentingests untrusted inputanydb_get_record_versioningests untrusted inputanydb_get_record_version_deltaingests untrusted inputanydb_run_scriptruns code / shellanydb_simulate_scriptruns code / shellanydb_validate_scriptruns code / shelldownload_fileingests untrusted inputupload_filenetwork egressanydb_add_commentno sensitive capabilityanydb_check_permissionsno sensitive capability
Show 34 more tools ↓
anydb_create_docgen_templateno sensitive capabilityanydb_create_reportno sensitive capabilityanydb_create_viewno sensitive capabilityanydb_delete_docgen_templateno sensitive capabilityanydb_delete_viewno sensitive capabilityanydb_get_inboxno sensitive capabilityanydb_get_permissionsno sensitive capabilityanydb_get_reportno sensitive capabilityanydb_list_docgen_templatesno sensitive capabilityanydb_list_record_versionsno sensitive capabilityanydb_list_reportsno sensitive capabilityanydb_list_viewsno sensitive capabilityanydb_resolve_commentno sensitive capabilityanydb_revert_record_to_versionno sensitive capabilityanydb_update_docgen_templateno sensitive capabilityanydb_update_reportno sensitive capabilityanydb_update_viewno sensitive capabilitybulk_create_recordsno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_recordsno sensitive capabilitycomplete_file_uploadno sensitive capabilitycopy_recordno sensitive capabilitycreate_recordno sensitive capabilitydelete_recordno sensitive capabilityget_recordno sensitive capabilityget_templateno sensitive capabilitylist_databases_for_teamno sensitive capabilitylist_recordsno sensitive capabilitylist_teamsno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitymove_recordno sensitive capabilityprepare_file_uploadno sensitive capabilitysearch_recordsno sensitive capabilitysearch_team_recordsno sensitive capabilityupdate_recordno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (44 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 9
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.0.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v2.3.0 |
A 95/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v2.2.0 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v2.0.4 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v2.0.3 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
Show 4 more versions ↓
v2.0.2 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
v2.0.0 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v1.0.12 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-14 |
v1.0.4 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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