Anvilterm MCP Server
anvilterm
npm
v0.2.73
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
AnvilTerm — AI-era web terminal with tabs, image overlays, table detection, and session persistence
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 10.6 = 89. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 89 − 12 = 77. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 28
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (lib/profiles-presets.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`lib/profiles-presets.js:54`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fig', 'gcloud-home/.config/gcloud', ], }, aws: { // AWS isolation gotcha — config + credentials honour
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/profiles-presets.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (server.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`server.js:608`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: " "\$ANVIL_AWS_FAKE_HOME/.aws/credentials" 2>/dev/null aws() { HOME="\$ANVIL_AWS_FAKE_HOME" __anvil_aws_inner "\$@"; }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/client.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/client.js:1903`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ey: 'gcloud', label: '~/.config/gcloud' }, { key: 'aws', label: '~/.aws' }, { key: 'kubectl', label: '~/.kube'
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/client.js
high Tool "terminal_run" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "terminal_run" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool terminal_run
high Tool "swarm_spawn" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "swarm_spawn" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "spawn" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool swarm_spawn
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/anvil-showcase.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/anvil-showcase.js:34151`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: lit("\n").map((line) => exec(expandTabs(line), columns, options)).join("\n"); } // node_modules/terminal-size/index.js
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/anvil-showcase.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/anvilterm-agent-loop.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/anvilterm-agent-loop.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const { setTimeout: delay } = require('timers/promises'); // --- Arg parsing -
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/anvilterm-agent-loop.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/anvilterm-doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/anvilterm-doctor.js:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } = require('child_process'); const ROOT = path.resolve(__dirname, '..'); const SKILL_SRC = path.join(ROOT,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/anvilterm-doctor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/anvilterm-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/anvilterm-mcp.js:114`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); let spawnedServerProc = null; function readSwarmMemoryForPrompt() { try {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/anvilterm-mcp.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/anvilterm.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/anvilterm.js:206`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ync, spawn } = require('child_process'); // First positional non-flag arg is the path. Empty / no arg → no-op. cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/anvilterm.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/arena-summary.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/arena-summary.js:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const ARENA_DIR = path.join(os.homedir(), '.anvil', 'arena'); const WORKSPACES
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/arena-summary.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/codex-client.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/codex-client.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , execFile } = require('child_process'); const { promisify } = require('util'); const pExecFile = promisify(execFile); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/codex-client.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/forge.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/forge.js:597`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); function fetchSkillRepo(item, destDir) { if (!item.repo) throw new Error('ski
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/forge.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/keyring-store.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/keyring-store.js:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } = require('child_process'); const os = require('os'); const SERVICE_PREFIX = 'anvilterm'; function fullNam
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/keyring-store.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (lib/models-catalog.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`lib/models-catalog.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } = require('child_process'); const { promisify } = require('util'); const pExecFile = promisify(execFile);
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/models-catalog.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([swarm_room_listen, swarm_room_thread]) co-exist with external-action tools ([terminal_run, swarm_spawn]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [swarm_room_listen, swarm_room_thread] → sinks [terminal_run, swarm_spawn]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow swarm_room_listen → terminal_run
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (lib/models-catalog.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`lib/models-catalog.js:75`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 0); const r = await fetch('https://models.dev/api.json', { signal: ac.signal }); clearTimeout(t); if (!r.ok)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/models-catalog.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (lib/usage-snapshot.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`lib/usage-snapshot.js:58`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y { const r = await fetch('https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/wham/usage', { headers: { Authorization: `B
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/usage-snapshot.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (server.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`server.js:4050`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ll; const r = await fetch('https://api.anthropic.com/api/oauth/usage', { headers: { 'Authorization': `
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server server.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/anvilterm-doctor.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/anvilterm-doctor.js:55`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n onPath(bin) { try { execSync(`command -v ${bin}`, { stdio: 'pipe' }); return true; } catch { return false; } } funct
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/anvilterm-doctor.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (bin/anvilterm.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`bin/anvilterm.js:323`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: '); try { execSync(`npx esbuild "${srcPath}" --bundle --outfile="${bundlePath}" --format=iife --platform=b
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/anvilterm.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "terminal_run"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "terminal_run" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool terminal_run · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (lib/codex-client.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`lib/codex-client.js:190`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const mod = await import(SDK_PACKAGE); _Codex = mod.Codex; if (!_Codex) throw new Error('@openai/codex-sdk
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server lib/codex-client.js
low Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (public/bundle.js)MTC-SRC-006
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`public/bundle.js:16979`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: key: "gcloud", label: "~/.config/gcloud" }, { key: "aws", label: "~/.aws" }, { key: "kubectl", label: "~/.kube"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server public/bundle.js
low Mutating tool "terminal_run" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "terminal_run" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool terminal_run
low Mutating tool "swarm_spawn" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "swarm_spawn" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool swarm_spawn
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (public/lottie.min.js)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`public/lottie.min.js:1`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: _rt,expression_function=eval("[function _expression_function(){"+val+";scoped_bm_rt=$bm_rt}]")[0],numKeys=property.kf?da
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server public/lottie.min.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"anvilterm" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node lib/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package anvilterm
Tools 35
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
swarm_room_listeningests untrusted inputswarm_room_threadingests untrusted inputswarm_spawnruns code / shellterminal_runruns code / shellanalyze_video_or_youtubeno sensitive capabilityarena_currentno sensitive capabilityarena_estimate_costno sensitive capabilityarena_launchno sensitive capabilityarena_push_artifactno sensitive capabilityimage_battle_launchno sensitive capability
Show 25 more tools ↓
lookup_modelsno sensitive capabilityswarm_artifact_saveno sensitive capabilityswarm_check_stuckno sensitive capabilityswarm_memory_readno sensitive capabilityswarm_memory_updateno sensitive capabilityswarm_room_listno sensitive capabilityswarm_room_postno sensitive capabilityswarm_routeno sensitive capabilityswarm_vendorsno sensitive capabilitytask_createno sensitive capabilitytask_deleteno sensitive capabilitytask_listno sensitive capabilitytask_updateno sensitive capabilityterminal_closeno sensitive capabilityterminal_createno sensitive capabilityterminal_listno sensitive capabilityterminal_readno sensitive capabilityterminal_screenno sensitive capabilityterminal_screenshotno sensitive capabilityterminal_writeno sensitive capabilitytui_chooseno sensitive capabilitytui_interruptno sensitive capabilitytui_paste_refno sensitive capabilitytui_typeno sensitive capabilityvideo_analyzeno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.73 latest |
C 77/100 | 28 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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