Gitlab (anupsahu) MCP Server

@anupsahu/gitlab-mcp npm v1.2.2

Published by @anupsahu — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Production-ready MCP server for GitLab API with OAuth 2.0 PKCE authentication

Trust grade
A
93/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 93/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 93/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 3

high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004

Tools that read sensitive data ([get_file_contents, get_repository_tree]) and tools that can send data out ([create_issue, create_issue_note, create_issue_link]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.

Evidence: sources [get_file_contents, get_repository_tree] → sinks [create_issue, create_issue_note, create_issue_link]

Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.

Location: flow get_file_contents → create_issue

low Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint in packaging/dev tooling (build/test/utils/server-launcher.js)MTC-SRC-003

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/test/utils/server-launcher.js:179`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: const response = await fetch(`http://${HOST}:${port}/health`, { method: 'GET', signal:

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/test/utils/server-launcher.js

low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (build/test/utils/server-launcher.js)MTC-SRC-002

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`build/test/utils/server-launcher.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import * as path from 'path'; export const HOST = process.env.HOST || '127.0.0.1

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server build/test/utils/server-launcher.js

Tools 85

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_issuenetwork egress
  • create_issue_linknetwork egress
  • create_issue_notenetwork egress
  • get_file_contentsreads sensitive data
  • get_repository_treereads sensitive data
  • bulk_publish_draft_notesno sensitive capability
  • cancel_pipelineno sensitive capability
  • create_branchno sensitive capability
  • create_draft_noteno sensitive capability
  • create_labelno sensitive capability
Show 75 more tools ↓
  • create_merge_requestno sensitive capability
  • create_merge_request_noteno sensitive capability
  • create_merge_request_threadno sensitive capability
  • create_milestoneno sensitive capability
  • create_noteno sensitive capability
  • create_or_update_fileno sensitive capability
  • create_pipelineno sensitive capability
  • create_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • create_wiki_pageno sensitive capability
  • delete_draft_noteno sensitive capability
  • delete_issueno sensitive capability
  • delete_issue_linkno sensitive capability
  • delete_labelno sensitive capability
  • delete_milestoneno sensitive capability
  • delete_wiki_pageno sensitive capability
  • edit_milestoneno sensitive capability
  • fork_repositoryno sensitive capability
  • get_branch_diffsno sensitive capability
  • get_commitno sensitive capability
  • get_commit_diffno sensitive capability
  • get_draft_noteno sensitive capability
  • get_issueno sensitive capability
  • get_issue_linkno sensitive capability
  • get_labelno sensitive capability
  • get_merge_requestno sensitive capability
  • get_merge_request_diffsno sensitive capability
  • get_milestoneno sensitive capability
  • get_milestone_burndown_eventsno sensitive capability
  • get_milestone_issueno sensitive capability
  • get_milestone_merge_requestsno sensitive capability
  • get_namespaceno sensitive capability
  • get_pipelineno sensitive capability
  • get_pipeline_jobno sensitive capability
  • get_pipeline_job_outputno sensitive capability
  • get_projectno sensitive capability
  • get_usersno sensitive capability
  • get_wiki_pageno sensitive capability
  • list_commitsno sensitive capability
  • list_draft_notesno sensitive capability
  • list_group_iterationsno sensitive capability
  • list_group_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_issue_discussionsno sensitive capability
  • list_issue_linksno sensitive capability
  • list_issuesno sensitive capability
  • list_labelsno sensitive capability
  • list_merge_request_diffsno sensitive capability
  • list_merge_requestsno sensitive capability
  • list_milestonesno sensitive capability
  • list_namespacesno sensitive capability
  • list_pipeline_jobsno sensitive capability
  • list_pipeline_trigger_jobsno sensitive capability
  • list_pipelinesno sensitive capability
  • list_project_membersno sensitive capability
  • list_projectsno sensitive capability
  • list_wiki_pagesno sensitive capability
  • merge_merge_requestno sensitive capability
  • mr_discussionsno sensitive capability
  • my_issuesno sensitive capability
  • oauth_login_pkceno sensitive capability
  • oauth_logoutno sensitive capability
  • oauth_statusno sensitive capability
  • promote_milestoneno sensitive capability
  • publish_draft_noteno sensitive capability
  • push_filesno sensitive capability
  • retry_pipelineno sensitive capability
  • search_repositoriesno sensitive capability
  • update_draft_noteno sensitive capability
  • update_issueno sensitive capability
  • update_issue_noteno sensitive capability
  • update_labelno sensitive capability
  • update_merge_requestno sensitive capability
  • update_merge_request_noteno sensitive capability
  • update_wiki_pageno sensitive capability
  • upload_markdownno sensitive capability
  • verify_namespaceno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.2.2 latest A 93/100 3 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 93/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @anupsahu/gitlab-mcp --online

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Other implementations of Gitlab 25

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 26 side by side →

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