Sitecore MCP Server

This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get-pages-by-site → logging-get-logs → get-powershell-documentation. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.

Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.

Location: flow get-pages-by-site → logging-get-logs → get-powershell-documentation

Tool "get-powershell-documentation" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "powershell" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool get-powershell-documentation

Tool "run-powershell-script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "powershell" in tool name, parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.

Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.

Location: tool run-powershell-script

In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.js:17381`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: h); const validate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode)(this, this.scope

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/bundle.js

Tool "get-powershell-documentation" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool get-powershell-documentation · inputSchema.properties.command

Tool "run-powershell-script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.

Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.

Location: tool run-powershell-script · inputSchema.properties.script

Tool "get-powershell-documentation" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool get-powershell-documentation

Tool "run-powershell-script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.

Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.

Location: tool run-powershell-script