Obsidian (aniketbiswas) MCP Server
@aniketbiswas/obsidian-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.2
Published by @aniketbiswas — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for integrating AI assistants with Obsidian via the Local REST API plugin. 40+ tools for vault management, notes, search, and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([list_files]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [list_files] → sinks [execute_command]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow list_files → execute_command
high Tool "execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_command
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_command
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
Tools 62
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_filewrites filesexecute_commandruns code / shelllist_filesreads sensitive dataadd_aliasesno sensitive capabilityadd_link_to_noteno sensitive capabilityadd_tagsno sensitive capabilityappend_to_active_noteno sensitive capabilityappend_to_daily_noteno sensitive capabilityappend_to_noteno sensitive capabilityappend_to_periodic_noteno sensitive capability
Show 52 more tools ↓
copy_noteno sensitive capabilitycreate_meeting_noteno sensitive capabilitycreate_noteno sensitive capabilitycreate_note_from_templateno sensitive capabilitycreate_project_noteno sensitive capabilitydaily_journal_entryno sensitive capabilitydaily_standupno sensitive capabilitydelete_noteno sensitive capabilitydivideno sensitive capabilityechono sensitive capabilityexample_asyncno sensitive capabilityexample_multi_paramno sensitive capabilityexample_toolno sensitive capabilityexample_with_errorno sensitive capabilityfind_broken_linksno sensitive capabilityfind_notes_by_nameno sensitive capabilityfind_orphan_notesno sensitive capabilityget_active_noteno sensitive capabilityget_all_tags_in_vaultno sensitive capabilityget_backlinksno sensitive capabilityget_commandsno sensitive capabilityget_current_timeno sensitive capabilityget_daily_noteno sensitive capabilityget_file_statsno sensitive capabilityget_frontmatterno sensitive capabilityget_link_graph_datano sensitive capabilityget_outgoing_linksno sensitive capabilityget_periodic_noteno sensitive capabilityget_recent_notesno sensitive capabilityget_tagsno sensitive capabilityget_vault_structureno sensitive capabilitygreetno sensitive capabilityinsert_under_headingno sensitive capabilitylist_all_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_templatesno sensitive capabilitymultiplyno sensitive capabilityopen_noteno sensitive capabilityprepend_to_noteno sensitive capabilityquick_captureno sensitive capabilityread_noteno sensitive capabilityremove_tagsno sensitive capabilityreplace_in_noteno sensitive capabilitysearch_by_tagno sensitive capabilitysearch_in_folderno sensitive capabilitysearch_notesno sensitive capabilitysearch_with_contextno sensitive capabilityset_frontmatter_propertyno sensitive capabilitysimple_searchno sensitive capabilitysubtractno sensitive capabilityupdate_frontmatterno sensitive capabilityupdate_noteno sensitive capabilityvault_statusno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (62 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @aniketbiswas/obsidian-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Obsidian 37
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 38 side by side →
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