Angr Api — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "angr-api-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "angr-api-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "angr-api-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 99,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "minimal",
"label": "capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "minimal",
"reasons": [],
"tags": []
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x04/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x04/solve.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x04/solve.py"
},
"evidence": ".write(main()) assert subprocess.check_output('./crackme0x04 < input', shell=True) == b'IOLI Crackme Level 0x04\\nPassw",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x04/solve.py",
"line": 33,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x05/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x05/solve.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x05/solve.py"
},
"evidence": ".write(main()) assert subprocess.check_output('./crackme0x05 < input', shell=True) == b'IOLI Crackme Level 0x05\\nPassw",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x05/solve.py",
"line": 38,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/enlightenment/classify.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/enlightenment/classify.py:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/enlightenment/classify.py"
},
"evidence": "try: ldd_out = subprocess.check_output(['ldd', f]) except subprocess.CalledProcessError: continue",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/enlightenment/classify.py",
"line": 15,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_rev250/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_rev250/solve.py:56`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_rev250/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "team = main() p = subprocess.Popen([\"./FUck_binary\"], env={\"LD_LIBRARY_PATH\": \".\"}, stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_rev250/solve.py",
"line": 56,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (data/angr_doc_source/examples/insomnihack_aeg/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/insomnihack_aeg/solve.py:114`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/insomnihack_aeg/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "./demo_bin') assert subprocess.check_output('(cat ./demo_bin-exploit; echo echo BUMO) | ./demo_bin', shell=True) ==",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/insomnihack_aeg/solve.py",
"line": 114,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (data/angr_doc_source/examples/java_crackme1/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/java_crackme1/solve.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/java_crackme1/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "t the real code p = subprocess.Popen([\"java\", \"-jar\", binary_path], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE)",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/java_crackme1/solve.py",
"line": 29,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (data/angr_doc_source/examples/mma_simplehash/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/mma_simplehash/solve.py:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/mma_simplehash/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "flag = main() p = subprocess.Popen(['./simple_hash'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subpro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/mma_simplehash/solve.py",
"line": 103,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (data/angr_doc_source/examples/secconquals2016_ropsynth/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/secconquals2016_ropsynth/solve.py:184`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/secconquals2016_ropsynth/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "): try: r = subprocess.Popen([\"./ropsynth.py\"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stdout=subprocess.PIPE) except OS",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/secconquals2016_ropsynth/solve.py",
"line": 184,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (data/angr_doc_source/examples/secuinside2016mbrainfuzz/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/secuinside2016mbrainfuzz/solve.py:145`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/secuinside2016mbrainfuzz/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "main(b) assert subprocess.check_output([b,p]) == b'SUCCESS\\n' if __name__ == '__main__': main(sys.argv[1])",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/secuinside2016mbrainfuzz/solve.py",
"line": 145,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (data/angr_doc_source/examples/simple_heap_overflow/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/simple_heap_overflow/solve.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/simple_heap_overflow/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "ure it worked out = subprocess.check_output(\"{0} < {1}\".format( os.path.join(DIR,\"simple_heap_overflow\"),",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/simple_heap_overflow/solve.py",
"line": 70,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"angr-api-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "angr-api-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "6995ba6dc1f68e0c45b428e9b010658bf97c6d634cc2e06e2cf400a62241f4ab",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 10,
"info": 1
}
}
}