Angr Api — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "angr-api-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "angr-api-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "angr-api-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "F",
"score": {
"score": 42,
"grade": "F",
"band": "F",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 50,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 6.3,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-004",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-004",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 7.7
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 7.7
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 3.85
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.54
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.54
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.54
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.54
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.54
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.54
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.54
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-004",
"title": "Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/grub/solve.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/grub/solve.py:77`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/grub/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "\\x08\\x08\\x08\\x08\\x08\\x08\\x08\\x08\\x08\\x08\\x08\\x08",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-004",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/grub/solve.py",
"line": 77
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-004",
"title": "Obfuscated / encoded payload in server code (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_fast.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_fast.py:1704`): Decoding an encoded blob and executing it is how malicious logic is hidden from human review of the source. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_fast.py"
},
"evidence": "\\x00\\x10\\x00\\x00\\x85\\x00\\xeb\\xe9",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-004",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_fast.py",
"line": 1704
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_base.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_base.py:632`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_base.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_base.py",
"line": 632
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_emulated.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_emulated.py:1414`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_emulated.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/cfg_emulated.py",
"line": 1414
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/indirect_jump_resolvers/jumptable.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/indirect_jump_resolvers/jumptable.py:637`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/indirect_jump_resolvers/jumptable.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/cfg/indirect_jump_resolvers/jumptable.py",
"line": 637
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/data_dep/data_dependency_analysis.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/data_dep/data_dependency_analysis.py:219`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/data_dep/data_dependency_analysis.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/data_dep/data_dependency_analysis.py",
"line": 219
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/ddg.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/ddg.py:752`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/ddg.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/ddg.py",
"line": 752
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/decompiler/optimization_passes/const_prop_reverter.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/decompiler/optimization_passes/const_prop_reverter.py:235`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/decompiler/optimization_passes/const_prop_reverter.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/decompiler/optimization_passes/const_prop_reverter.py",
"line": 235
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/deobfuscator/data_transformation_embedder.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/deobfuscator/data_transformation_embedder.py:271`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/deobfuscator/data_transformation_embedder.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/deobfuscator/data_transformation_embedder.py",
"line": 271
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/deobfuscator/string_obf_finder.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/deobfuscator/string_obf_finder.py:295`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/deobfuscator/string_obf_finder.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(\n ",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/deobfuscator/string_obf_finder.py",
"line": 295
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/smc.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/smc.py:42`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/smc.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/smc.py",
"line": 42
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (data/angr_source/angr/analyses/vfg.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/analyses/vfg.py:694`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/vfg.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/analyses/vfg.py",
"line": 694
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/0ctf_trace/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/0ctf_trace/solve.py:96`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/0ctf_trace/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/0ctf_trace/solve.py",
"line": 96
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/9447_nobranch/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/9447_nobranch/solve.py:63`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/9447_nobranch/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/9447_nobranch/solve.py",
"line": 63
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/ais3_crackme/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/ais3_crackme/solve.py:29`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/ais3_crackme/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/ais3_crackme/solve.py",
"line": 29
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/android_arm_license_validation/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/android_arm_license_validation/solve.py:43`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/android_arm_license_validation/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/android_arm_license_validation/solve.py",
"line": 43
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/asisctffinals2015_fake/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/asisctffinals2015_fake/solve.py:38`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/asisctffinals2015_fake/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/asisctffinals2015_fake/solve.py",
"line": 38
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/asisctffinals2015_license/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/asisctffinals2015_license/solve.py:56`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/asisctffinals2015_license/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/asisctffinals2015_license/solve.py",
"line": 56
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/cmu_binary_bomb/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/cmu_binary_bomb/solve.py:52`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/cmu_binary_bomb/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/cmu_binary_bomb/solve.py",
"line": 52
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2016quals_baby-re/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2016quals_baby-re/solve.py:36`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2016quals_baby-re/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2016quals_baby-re/solve.py",
"line": 36
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/witchcraft.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/witchcraft.py:66`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/witchcraft.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/witchcraft.py",
"line": 66
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_sokohashv2/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_sokohashv2/solve.py:159`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_sokohashv2/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_sokohashv2/solve.py",
"line": 159
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x04/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x04/solve.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x04/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.check_output(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x04/solve.py",
"line": 33
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x05/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x05/solve.py:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x05/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.check_output(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/CSCI-4968-MBE/challenges/crackme0x05/solve.py",
"line": 38
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/enlightenment/classify.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/enlightenment/classify.py:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/enlightenment/classify.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.check_output(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/defcon2017quals_crackme2000/enlightenment/classify.py",
"line": 15
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_rev250/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_rev250/solve.py:56`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_rev250/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/ekopartyctf2016_rev250/solve.py",
"line": 56
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/insomnihack_aeg/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/insomnihack_aeg/solve.py:114`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/insomnihack_aeg/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.check_output(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/insomnihack_aeg/solve.py",
"line": 114
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/java_crackme1/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/java_crackme1/solve.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/java_crackme1/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/java_crackme1/solve.py",
"line": 29
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/mma_simplehash/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/mma_simplehash/solve.py:103`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/mma_simplehash/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/mma_simplehash/solve.py",
"line": 103
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/secconquals2016_ropsynth/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/secconquals2016_ropsynth/solve.py:184`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/secconquals2016_ropsynth/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/secconquals2016_ropsynth/solve.py",
"line": 184
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/secuinside2016mbrainfuzz/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/secuinside2016mbrainfuzz/solve.py:145`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/secuinside2016mbrainfuzz/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.check_output(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/secuinside2016mbrainfuzz/solve.py",
"line": 145
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (data/angr_doc_source/examples/simple_heap_overflow/solve.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_doc_source/examples/simple_heap_overflow/solve.py:70`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/simple_heap_overflow/solve.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.check_output(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "data/angr_doc_source/examples/simple_heap_overflow/solve.py",
"line": 70
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (data/angr_source/angr/project.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`data/angr_source/angr/project.py:871`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "data/angr_source/angr/project.py"
},
"evidence": "pickle.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "data/angr_source/angr/project.py",
"line": 871
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"angr-api-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "angr-api-mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"angr-api-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "angr-api-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "6995ba6dc1f68e0c45b428e9b010658bf97c6d634cc2e06e2cf400a62241f4ab",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 32,
"medium": 1,
"low": 1,
"info": 1
}
}
}