Android String Manager MCP Server

android-string-manager npm v2.3.0

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

Trust grade
A
92/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 92/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 92/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/git-diff.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/git-diff.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { discoverLocales, getResDirs, val

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/tools/git-diff.js

Tools 24

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • add_pluralno sensitive capability
  • add_stringno sensitive capability
  • add_string_arrayno sensitive capability
  • add_stringsno sensitive capability
  • delete_pluralno sensitive capability
  • delete_stringno sensitive capability
  • delete_string_arrayno sensitive capability
  • diff_stringsno sensitive capability
  • export_csvno sensitive capability
  • find_duplicatesno sensitive capability
Show 14 more tools ↓
  • find_unused_keysno sensitive capability
  • get_stringno sensitive capability
  • import_csvno sensitive capability
  • lint_stringsno sensitive capability
  • list_localesno sensitive capability
  • list_missingno sensitive capability
  • rename_keyno sensitive capability
  • search_stringsno sensitive capability
  • sort_stringsno sensitive capability
  • translation_statsno sensitive capability
  • update_pluralno sensitive capability
  • update_stringno sensitive capability
  • update_string_arrayno sensitive capability
  • validate_placeholdersno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.3.0 latest A 92/100 1 1.9.0 2026-07-24

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 92/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan android-string-manager --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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