Vinted (andrijdavid) MCP Server
@andrijdavid/vinted-mcp
npm
v0.1.2
Published by @andrijdavid — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP Server for Vinted marketplace — search items, compare prices, analyze sellers across 19 countries.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 2 = 98. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/bundle.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/bundle.js:279`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: (moduleName) { return require(moduleName); } function defaultDesktopUserAgent() { return "Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; In
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bundle.js
Tools 34
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
brandno sensitive capabilitybudgetno sensitive capabilitybuy_or_skip_decisionno sensitive capabilitybuyCountryno sensitive capabilitycompare_pricesno sensitive capabilitycompareCountriesno sensitive capabilitycompareQueryno sensitive capabilityconditionno sensitive capabilitycountriesno sensitive capabilitycountryno sensitive capability
Show 24 more tools ↓
feePctno sensitive capabilityfind_best_dealno sensitive capabilityget_itemno sensitive capabilityget_sellerno sensitive capabilityget_trendingno sensitive capabilityitemno sensitive capabilityitemIdno sensitive capabilitylimitno sensitive capabilitymaxPriceno sensitive capabilityqueryno sensitive capabilityresale_arbitrage_estimatorno sensitive capabilityscreen_sellerno sensitive capabilitysearch_item_with_filtersno sensitive capabilitysearch_itemsno sensitive capabilitysellCountryno sensitive capabilitysellerIdno sensitive capabilityshippingCostno sensitive capabilitysizeno sensitive capabilitytrending_reportno sensitive capabilityVinted Categoriesno sensitive capabilityVinted Countriesno sensitive capabilityVinted Item By IDno sensitive capabilityVinted Search Queryno sensitive capabilityVinted Seller By IDno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (34 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 98/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @andrijdavid/vinted-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Vinted 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
MCP Server for Vinted marketplace — search items, compare prices, analyze sellers across 19 countries. Works with Claude Desktop, Cursor, and any MCP client.
MCP server for interacting with the Vinted marketplace
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