Anam MCP Server
anam-mcp
PyPI
v0.1.13
Published by anam-org — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Official Anam AI MCP server for managing AI personas
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_knowledge_document_download]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook_tool]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_knowledge_document_download] → sinks [create_webhook_tool]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_knowledge_document_download → create_webhook_tool
Tools 54
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhook_toolnetwork egressget_knowledge_document_downloadingests untrusted inputadd_avatar_to_meetingno sensitive capabilitycreate_avatarno sensitive capabilitycreate_knowledge_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_knowledge_toolno sensitive capabilitycreate_llmno sensitive capabilitycreate_personano sensitive capabilitycreate_session_tokenno sensitive capabilitycreate_share_linkno sensitive capability
Show 44 more tools ↓
create_voiceno sensitive capabilitydelete_avatarno sensitive capabilitydelete_knowledge_documentno sensitive capabilitydelete_knowledge_groupno sensitive capabilitydelete_llmno sensitive capabilitydelete_personano sensitive capabilitydelete_share_linkno sensitive capabilitydelete_toolno sensitive capabilitydelete_voiceno sensitive capabilitygenerate_avatar_videono sensitive capabilityget_avatarno sensitive capabilityget_knowledge_documentno sensitive capabilityget_knowledge_groupno sensitive capabilityget_llmno sensitive capabilityget_meeting_bot_statusno sensitive capabilityget_personano sensitive capabilityget_sessionno sensitive capabilityget_session_recordingno sensitive capabilityget_share_linkno sensitive capabilityget_toolno sensitive capabilityget_voiceno sensitive capabilitylist_avatarsno sensitive capabilitylist_knowledge_documentsno sensitive capabilitylist_knowledge_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_llmsno sensitive capabilitylist_meeting_botsno sensitive capabilitylist_personasno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_share_linksno sensitive capabilitylist_toolsno sensitive capabilitylist_voicesno sensitive capabilityremove_avatar_from_meetingno sensitive capabilitysearch_avatarsno sensitive capabilitysearch_knowledge_groupno sensitive capabilitysearch_voicesno sensitive capabilityupdate_avatarno sensitive capabilityupdate_knowledge_documentno sensitive capabilityupdate_knowledge_groupno sensitive capabilityupdate_llmno sensitive capabilityupdate_personano sensitive capabilityupdate_share_linkno sensitive capabilityupdate_toolno sensitive capabilityupdate_voiceno sensitive capabilityupload_knowledge_documentno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (54 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.13 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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