Anakin Io MCP Server
@anakin-io/mcp
npm
v0.3.0
Published by @anakin-io — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for Anakin (anakin.io) — gives AI agents in Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code, and other MCP-compatible clients native access to web scraping, search, crawling, mapping, agentic research, Wire actions, website monitor
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([scrape, search, map, crawl, wire_discover, wire_catalog, wire_read_action, monitor_list, session_list, browser_task]) co-exist with external-action tools ([monitor_create]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [scrape, search, map, crawl, wire_discover, wire_catalog, wire_read_action, monitor_list, session_list, browser_task] → sinks [monitor_create]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow scrape → monitor_create
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "scrape"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "scrape" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool scrape · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "map"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "map" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool map · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "crawl"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "crawl" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool crawl · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "browser_task"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "browser_task" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool browser_task · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_taskingests untrusted inputcrawlingests untrusted inputmapingests untrusted inputmonitor_createnetwork egressmonitor_listingests untrusted inputscrapeingests untrusted inputsearchingests untrusted inputsession_listingests untrusted inputwire_catalogingests untrusted inputwire_discoveringests untrusted input
Show 11 more tools ↓
wire_read_actioningests untrusted inputagentic_searchno sensitive capabilityai_visibility_searchno sensitive capabilityai_visibility_sourcesno sensitive capabilitymonitor_changesno sensitive capabilitymonitor_controlno sensitive capabilitysession_deleteno sensitive capabilitywire_buildno sensitive capabilitywire_identitiesno sensitive capabilitywire_loginno sensitive capabilitywire_write_actionno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.2.1 |
A 96/100 | 5 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @anakin-io/mcp --onlineMore in Browser Automation
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that integrates AgentQL data extraction capabilities.
Screenshot any URL or HTML as PNG/JPEG/WebP from your AI agent. Full-page, clean, no install.
MCP server for aria51 accessibility scanner
Bridge any browser web app to Claude Code via MCP
Browserbase’s official MCP server: cloud headless browsers for agents, with sessions and screenshots.
MCP server for AI web browser automation using Browserbase and Stagehand