Gitea (amonstack) MCP Server
@amonstack/gitea-mcp
npm
v0.7.0
Published by @amonstack — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that exposes Gitea issues, labels, milestones, and comments as tools for AI assistants
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/server.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/server.js:64`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rue; if (/(^|[-_.])(id_rsa|id_ed25519|id_ecdsa|identity|authorized_keys|known_hosts)$/.test(base)) return tr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/git-config.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/git-config.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { orderSchemesForCredentialStore, } from "./credentials.js"; /** Gitea di
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/git-config.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_issue, list_issue_attachments, get_issue_attachment, get_milestone, get_pull_request, get_action_run, get_release, get_release_by_tag, get_wiki_page, get_project]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_issue, create_comment, create_issue_attachment, create_issue_comment_attachment, create_pull_request]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_issue, list_issue_attachments, get_issue_attachment, get_milestone, get_pull_request, get_action_run, get_release, get_release_by_tag, get_wiki_p
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_issue → create_issue
Tools 74
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_commentnetwork egresscreate_issuenetwork egresscreate_issue_attachmentnetwork egresscreate_issue_comment_attachmentnetwork egresscreate_pull_requestnetwork egressget_action_runingests untrusted inputget_issueingests untrusted inputget_issue_attachmentingests untrusted inputget_milestoneingests untrusted inputget_projectingests untrusted input
Show 64 more tools ↓
get_pull_requestingests untrusted inputget_releaseingests untrusted inputget_release_by_tagingests untrusted inputget_wiki_pageingests untrusted inputlist_issue_attachmentsingests untrusted inputadd_issue_blockno sensitive capabilityadd_issue_dependencyno sensitive capabilityadd_issue_labelsno sensitive capabilityadd_topicno sensitive capabilitycancel_action_runno sensitive capabilitycheck_issue_blockedno sensitive capabilityclear_issue_labelsno sensitive capabilityconfigure_giteano sensitive capabilityconfigure_gitlabno sensitive capabilitycreate_labelno sensitive capabilitycreate_milestoneno sensitive capabilitycreate_releaseno sensitive capabilitycreate_wiki_pageno sensitive capabilitydelete_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_issueno sensitive capabilitydelete_issue_attachmentno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilitydelete_milestoneno sensitive capabilitydelete_releaseno sensitive capabilitydelete_wiki_pageno sensitive capabilityedit_issue_attachmentno sensitive capabilitygitea_statusno sensitive capabilitygitlab_statusno sensitive capabilityis_pull_mergedno sensitive capabilitylist_action_runsno sensitive capabilitylist_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_blocksno sensitive capabilitylist_issue_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitylist_issuesno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_milestonesno sensitive capabilitylist_my_reposno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_commitsno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_pull_requestsno sensitive capabilitylist_releasesno sensitive capabilitylist_topicsno sensitive capabilitylist_wiki_pagesno sensitive capabilitylist_wiki_revisionsno sensitive capabilitymerge_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityremove_issue_blockno sensitive capabilityremove_issue_dependencyno sensitive capabilityremove_issue_labelno sensitive capabilityremove_topicno sensitive capabilityreplace_issue_labelsno sensitive capabilityreplace_topicsno sensitive capabilityrerun_action_runno sensitive capabilityrerun_action_run_failed_jobsno sensitive capabilityresolve_repono sensitive capabilitysearch_issuesno sensitive capabilityupdate_commentno sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capabilityupdate_labelno sensitive capabilityupdate_milestoneno sensitive capabilityupdate_pull_requestno sensitive capabilityupdate_releaseno sensitive capabilityupdate_repono sensitive capabilityupdate_wiki_pageno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (74 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.7.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v0.6.0 |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.5.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v0.4.1 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v0.4.0 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-02 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v0.3.9 |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @amonstack/gitea-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Gitea 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
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Model Context Protocol server for Gitea (and Forgejo, Codeberg).
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