Amitnarw Web MCP Server
@amitnarw/web-mcp
npm
v0.1.6
Published by @amitnarw — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Dedicated browser automation MCP server using an isolated Chromium profile and Extension to provide AI browser control. Fully supports OpenCode, Cursor, Claude Code, Zed Editor, Sourcegraph Cody, Windsurf, Cline, and OpenAI Codex.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 2 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/browser.min.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/browser.min.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: awn as y,exec as S}from"child_process";import{promisify as E}from"util";var v=E(S),u=r.join(b.homedir(),".web-mcp");asyn
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/browser.min.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/interactive.min.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/interactive.min.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n as le,exec as me}from"child_process";import{promisify as De}from"util";async function $e(){try{let n=await(await impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/interactive.min.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/stop.min.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/stop.min.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ";import{exec as m}from"child_process";import{promisify as l}from"util";var t=l(m),p=i.join(c.homedir(),".web-mcp"),s=i.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/stop.min.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/cli/troubleshoot.min.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/cli/troubleshoot.min.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ";import{exec as u}from"child_process";import{promisify as x}from"util";var c=x(u);async function j(s){let e=["\x1B[36mR
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/troubleshoot.min.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/mcp/wrapper.min.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/mcp/wrapper.min.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: as F,execSync as E}from"child_process";import*as i from"fs";import*as u from"path";import*as J from"os";import{fileURLTo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp/wrapper.min.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@amitnarw/web-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node bin/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @amitnarw/web-mcp
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_close_tabno sensitive capabilitybrowser_doneno sensitive capabilitybrowser_dragno sensitive capabilitybrowser_evaluateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_fillno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_statusno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_tabsno sensitive capabilitybrowser_get_urlno sensitive capabilitybrowser_hoverno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
browser_navigateno sensitive capabilitybrowser_new_tabno sensitive capabilitybrowser_press_keyno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_scrollno sensitive capabilitybrowser_snapshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_startno sensitive capabilitybrowser_stopno sensitive capabilitybrowser_switch_tabno sensitive capabilitybrowser_typeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_waitno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.6 latest |
A 97/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @amitnarw/web-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Amitnarw Web 1
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