Codecompass MCP Server
@alvinveroy/codecompass
npm
v1.5.6
Published by @alvinveroy — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI-powered MCP server for codebase navigation and LLM prompt optimization
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/lib/repository.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/lib/repository.js:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); // Import exec const util_1 = require("util"); // To
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/lib/repository.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/lib/repository.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/lib/repository.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from "child_process"; // Import exec import { promisify } from "util"; // To promisify exec import { Q
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/lib/repository.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/version-bump.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/version-bump.js:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); // Parse command line arguments const args = process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/version-bump.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/tests/lib/repository.test.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/tests/lib/repository.test.js:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: TORY. vitest_1.vi.mock('child_process', async (importOriginal) => { const _actualCp = await importOriginal(); re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tests/lib/repository.test.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/scripts/version-bump.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/scripts/version-bump.ts:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; // Define version bump types type BumpType = 'major' | 'minor' | 'patch'; // P
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/scripts/version-bump.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/tests/lib/repository.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/tests/lib/repository.test.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e ExecException } from 'child_process'; // For type annotation // 1. Mock 'child_process' and replace 'exec' with a vi.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tests/lib/repository.test.ts
Tools 8
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
bb7_agent_queryno sensitive capabilitybb7_generate_suggestionno sensitive capabilitybb7_get_changelogno sensitive capabilitybb7_get_indexing_statusno sensitive capabilitybb7_get_repository_contextno sensitive capabilitybb7_get_session_historyno sensitive capabilitybb7_search_codeno sensitive capabilitybb7_switch_suggestion_modelno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (8 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.6 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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