almond-mcp
PyPI
v0.5.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Almond - MCP server for Rhino 8 with a semantic scene layer: curated furniture/drawing/diagram libraries, audited Karamba capsules, structured retrieval (SQLite FTS5 + R-tree scene ledger), and a TCP bridge into Rhino (RhinoAlmondBridge, port 5000)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`rhino_bridge.py:234`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: exec(script_code, exec_globals) guids = [str(g) for g in exec_globals.get("created_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server rhino_bridge.py
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
apply_drawing_styleno sensitive capabilityassign_materialno sensitive capabilitycreate_design_sceneno sensitive capabilitycreate_generation_planno sensitive capabilityexecute_rhino_scriptno sensitive capabilityexport_asset_contractno sensitive capabilityexport_structural_reportno sensitive capabilityget_blender_helper_scriptno sensitive capabilityget_design_sceneno sensitive capabilityget_diagram_assetno sensitive capabilityget_drawing_assetno sensitive capabilityget_drawing_recipeno sensitive capabilityget_generation_planno sensitive capabilityget_ikea_furnitureno sensitive capabilityget_logic_by_idno sensitive capabilityget_retrieval_statusno sensitive capabilityimport_asset_contractno sensitive capabilityimport_drawing_hatch_patternsno sensitive capabilitylist_capsulesno sensitive capabilitylist_diagram_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_drawing_assetsno sensitive capabilitylist_drawing_recipesno sensitive capabilitylist_ikea_furnitureno sensitive capabilitylist_libraryno sensitive capabilitylist_materialsno sensitive capabilityplace_diagram_assetno sensitive capabilityplace_drawing_assetno sensitive capabilityplace_ikea_furnitureno sensitive capabilitypublish_objects_to_chestnutno sensitive capabilitypublish_to_chestnutno sensitive capabilityregister_scene_instanceno sensitive capabilityremove_design_roomno sensitive capabilityremove_scene_instanceno sensitive capabilityrun_gh_definitionno sensitive capabilitysearch_diagram_assetsno sensitive capabilitysearch_drawing_assetsno sensitive capabilitysearch_ikea_furnitureno sensitive capabilityupdate_generation_stepno sensitive capabilityupsert_design_roomno sensitive capabilityvalidate_scene_layoutno sensitive capabilityvalidate_structureno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.5.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan almond-mcp --online --registry pypi
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