Supabase (aliyun-rds) MCP Server
@aliyun-rds/supabase-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.10
Published by @aliyun-rds — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for self-hosted Supabase instances. Allows AI assistants to interact with your self-hosted Supabase database.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:900`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; var execAsync = promisify(exec); async fu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Tools 27
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
connect_to_supabase_instancereads sensitive dataexecute_sqlreads sensitive datainstall_execute_sql_functionreads sensitive dataapply_migrationno sensitive capabilitycreate_auth_userno sensitive capabilitydelete_auth_userno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_supabase_instanceno sensitive capabilitygenerate_typescript_typesno sensitive capabilityget_anon_keyno sensitive capabilityget_auth_userno sensitive capability
Show 17 more tools ↓
get_current_supabase_instanceno sensitive capabilityget_database_connectionsno sensitive capabilityget_database_statsno sensitive capabilityget_project_urlno sensitive capabilityget_service_keyno sensitive capabilitylist_aliyun_supabase_instancesno sensitive capabilitylist_auth_usersno sensitive capabilitylist_extensionsno sensitive capabilitylist_migrationsno sensitive capabilitylist_realtime_publicationsno sensitive capabilitylist_storage_bucketsno sensitive capabilitylist_storage_objectsno sensitive capabilitylist_tablesno sensitive capabilityrebuild_hooksno sensitive capabilitysearch_docsno sensitive capabilityupdate_auth_userno sensitive capabilityverify_jwt_secretno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (27 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.10 latest |
A 92/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @aliyun-rds/supabase-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Supabase 11
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 12 side by side →
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