Algochains MCP Server
algochains-mcp-server
PyPI
v22.7.2
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11.7 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×4 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
| −9.5 | Unsafe deserialization ×2 MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
| −2.1 | Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 | supply-chain |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 21
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/algochains_mcp/data_ingestion.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/algochains_mcp/data_ingestion.py:326`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: id_rsa
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/algochains_mcp/data_ingestion.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (algoclaw/cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`algoclaw/cli.py:236`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server algoclaw/cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/algochains_mcp/adaptive_brain_status.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/algochains_mcp/adaptive_brain_status.py:163`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/algochains_mcp/adaptive_brain_status.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/algochains_mcp/agent_swarm/agent_orchestrator.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/algochains_mcp/agent_swarm/agent_orchestrator.py:20`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/algochains_mcp/agent_swarm/agent_orchestrator.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/algochains_mcp/http_bridge.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/algochains_mcp/http_bridge.py:1130`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/algochains_mcp/http_bridge.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/algochains_mcp/live_bot_intelligence/bot_ops.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/algochains_mcp/live_bot_intelligence/bot_ops.py:406`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/algochains_mcp/live_bot_intelligence/bot_ops.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/algochains_mcp/live_bot_intelligence/heartbeat.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/algochains_mcp/live_bot_intelligence/heartbeat.py:124`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/algochains_mcp/live_bot_intelligence/heartbeat.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/algochains_mcp/trading_system_health.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/algochains_mcp/trading_system_health.py:69`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/algochains_mcp/trading_system_health.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli/src/auth.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/src/auth.ts:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/src/auth.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli/src/commands/daemon.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/src/commands/daemon.ts:202`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/src/commands/daemon.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/cli/src/commands/doctor.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/src/commands/doctor.ts:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/src/commands/doctor.ts
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/cli/src/commands/auth_cmd.ts)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/src/commands/auth_cmd.ts:127`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fetch("https://paper-api.alpaca.markets/v2/account"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/src/commands/auth_cmd.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/cli/src/commands/daemon.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/src/commands/daemon.ts:306`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`launchctl load ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/src/commands/daemon.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/cli/src/commands/doctor.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/src/commands/doctor.ts:137`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/src/commands/doctor.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/cli/src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/src/index.ts:377`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`python3 scripts/quickstart.py --generate-config ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/src/index.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/cli/src/plugins/manager.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/cli/src/plugins/manager.ts:124`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`tar -xzf "${tarPath}" -C "${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/src/plugins/manager.ts
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (scripts/quickstart.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`scripts/quickstart.py:128`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: __import__(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/quickstart.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/algochains_mcp/tournament/numerai/run_pipeline.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/algochains_mcp/tournament/numerai/run_pipeline.py:188`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: __import__(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/algochains_mcp/tournament/numerai/run_pipeline.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (src/algochains_mcp/tournament/numerai/model_zoo.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`src/algochains_mcp/tournament/numerai/model_zoo.py:205`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pickle.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/algochains_mcp/tournament/numerai/model_zoo.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (src/algochains_mcp/tournament/numerai/train.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`src/algochains_mcp/tournament/numerai/train.py:188`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pickle.load(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/algochains_mcp/tournament/numerai/train.py
low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011
"algochains-mcp-server" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.
Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.
Location: package algochains-mcp-server
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v22.7.2 latest |
C 77/100 | 21 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan algochains-mcp-server --online --registry pypiMore in Finance & Commerce
Security scan results for the 1money MCP server.
Security scan results for the 8dx MCP server.
Security scan results for the A Stock MCP server.
Security scan results for the A0nexus Bitcoin MCP server.
Security scan results for the A2a Swap Sdk MCP server.
Security scan results for the Abacatepay MCP server.