Raw scan report

Aleph Rlm — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "aleph-rlm",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "aleph-rlm"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "aleph-rlm"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 93,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "repo",
        "label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
        "appliedPenalty": 1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": false,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
      "title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (aleph/repl/sandbox.py)",
      "category": "injection",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`aleph/repl/sandbox.py:791`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "aleph/repl/sandbox.py"
      },
      "evidence": "ret = eval(eval_code, self._namespace, self._namespace) return ret _execu",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
        "file": "aleph/repl/sandbox.py",
        "line": 791,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
      "title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (aleph/repl/sandbox.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`aleph/repl/sandbox.py:791`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "aleph/repl/sandbox.py"
      },
      "evidence": "ret = eval(eval_code, self._namespace, self._namespace) return ret _execu",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
        "file": "aleph/repl/sandbox.py",
        "line": 791,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (aleph/cli.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`aleph/cli.py:496`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "aleph/cli.py"
      },
      "evidence": "y: result = subprocess.run( [claude_exe, \"mcp\", \"list\"], capture_output=True",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "aleph/cli.py",
        "line": 496,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (aleph/mcp/io_utils.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`aleph/mcp/io_utils.py:146`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "aleph/mcp/io_utils.py"
      },
      "evidence": "result = subprocess.run( [pdf_tool, \"-layout\", str(path), \"-\"], c",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "aleph/mcp/io_utils.py",
        "line": 146,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (aleph/providers/llamacpp.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`aleph/providers/llamacpp.py:178`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "aleph/providers/llamacpp.py"
      },
      "evidence": "self._server_process = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "aleph/providers/llamacpp.py",
        "line": 178,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (aleph/repl/node_runtime.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`aleph/repl/node_runtime.py:249`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "aleph/repl/node_runtime.py"
      },
      "evidence": "self._process = subprocess.Popen( [node_bin, str(worker_path), self.context_var_name], s",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "aleph/repl/node_runtime.py",
        "line": 249,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (aleph/repl/sandbox.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`aleph/repl/sandbox.py:789`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "aleph/repl/sandbox.py"
      },
      "evidence": "o): exec(exec_code, self._namespace, self._namespace) if eval_code is not None:",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "aleph/repl/sandbox.py",
        "line": 789,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_cli.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_cli.py:190`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "tests/test_cli.py"
      },
      "evidence": "nts[1] result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, \"-m\", \"aleph.mcp.local_server\", \"--help\"],",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "tests/test_cli.py",
        "line": 190,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_mcp_local_server.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_mcp_local_server.py:663`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "tests/test_mcp_local_server.py"
      },
      "evidence": "ion.repl.execute_async(\"exec('x=1')\") assert result.error is not None @pytest.mark.asyncio async def te",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "tests/test_mcp_local_server.py",
        "line": 663,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_sandbox.py)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_sandbox.py:79`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "tests/test_sandbox.py"
      },
      "evidence": "_validate_ast(\"exec('x=1')\", set()) def test_compile_forbidden(self) -> None: with pytest.raises(S",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "tests/test_sandbox.py",
        "line": 79,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [],
  "surfaceDigest": "3fcb32bff85aa7d68d1fd8a3355b63872c01d5d8b69a9cab1ecce06018b9c391",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 0,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 7,
      "medium": 0,
      "low": 3,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}