Sage (alemdarlabs) MCP Server
@alemdarlabs/sage-mcp
npm
v0.1.13
Published by @alemdarlabs — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Sage MCP server for Unreal Engine
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 7 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (npm/bin/sage.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`npm/bin/sage.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawn } = require('node:child_process'); const fs = require('node:fs'); const path = require('node:path'); const { conf
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server npm/bin/sage.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (npm/lib/claude.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`npm/lib/claude.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process'); function quoteWindowsArg(value) { const text = String(value); if (!/[ \t"&
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server npm/lib/claude.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (npm/lib/codex.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`npm/lib/codex.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process'); function codexMcpAddArgs(name, env = {}) { const args = ['mcp', 'add', name]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server npm/lib/codex.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (npm/lib/download.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`npm/lib/download.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process'); const { fileURLToPath } = require('node:url'); const { archiveExt, platformKey
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server npm/lib/download.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (npm/lib/install.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`npm/lib/install.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process'); const { ensurePluginPackage } = require('./download'); const { backupExistingD
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server npm/lib/install.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (npm/scripts/package-assets.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`npm/scripts/package-assets.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process'); const crypto = require('node:crypto'); const { pluginArchiveName, serverAr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server npm/scripts/package-assets.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (npm/scripts/release-check.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`npm/scripts/release-check.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nSync } = require('node:child_process'); const { pluginArchiveName, serverArchiveName } = require('../lib/download'); c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server npm/scripts/release-check.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@alemdarlabs/sage-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node npm/scripts/postinstall.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @alemdarlabs/sage-mcp
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.13 latest |
A 92/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @alemdarlabs/sage-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Sage 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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