Kanbn MCP Server
@aixlab/kanbn-mcp
npm
v1.0.2
Published by @aixlab — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP Server for the kan.bn API
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "webhook-create"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "webhook-create" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow webhook-create
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "webhook-update"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "webhook-update" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow webhook-update
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([webhook-create, webhook-update]) and tools that can send data out ([webhook-list, webhook-create, webhook-update, webhook-delete, webhook-test]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [webhook-create, webhook-update] → sinks [webhook-list, webhook-create, webhook-update, webhook-delete, webhook-test]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow webhook-create → webhook-list
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:1564`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const zodSchema = eval(zodSchemaString); if (typeof zodSchema?.parse !== 'function') { throw n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:1664`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const zodSchema = eval(zodSchemaString); if (typeof zodSchema?.parse !== 'function') { throw n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.ts
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:1564`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const zodSchema = eval(zodSchemaString); if (typeof zodSchema?.parse !== 'function') { throw n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:1664`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const zodSchema = eval(zodSchemaString); if (typeof zodSchema?.parse !== 'function') { throw n
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.ts
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "webhook-create"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "webhook-create" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool webhook-create · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "webhook-update"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "webhook-update" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool webhook-update · inputSchema.properties.url
Tools 79
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
webhook-createnetwork egressreads sensitive datawebhook-updatenetwork egressreads sensitive datawebhook-deletenetwork egresswebhook-listnetwork egresswebhook-testnetwork egressattachment-confirmno sensitive capabilityattachment-deleteno sensitive capabilityattachment-generateUploadUrlno sensitive capabilityboard-allno sensitive capabilityboard-byIdno sensitive capability
Show 69 more tools ↓
board-bySlugno sensitive capabilityboard-checkSlugAvailabilityno sensitive capabilityboard-createno sensitive capabilityboard-deleteno sensitive capabilityboard-moveno sensitive capabilityboard-updateno sensitive capabilitycard-addCommentno sensitive capabilitycard-addOrRemoveLabelno sensitive capabilitycard-addOrRemoveMemberno sensitive capabilitycard-byIdno sensitive capabilitycard-createno sensitive capabilitycard-deleteno sensitive capabilitycard-deleteCommentno sensitive capabilitycard-duplicateno sensitive capabilitycard-getActivitiesno sensitive capabilitycard-updateno sensitive capabilitycard-updateCommentno sensitive capabilitychecklist-createno sensitive capabilitychecklist-createItemno sensitive capabilitychecklist-deleteno sensitive capabilitychecklist-deleteItemno sensitive capabilitychecklist-updateno sensitive capabilitychecklist-updateItemno sensitive capabilityhealth-healthno sensitive capabilityhealth-statsno sensitive capabilityimport-github-getProjectsno sensitive capabilityimport-github-importProjectsno sensitive capabilityimport-trello-getBoardsno sensitive capabilityimport-trello-importBoardsno sensitive capabilityintegration-disconnectno sensitive capabilityintegration-getAuthorizationUrlno sensitive capabilityintegration-providersno sensitive capabilitylabel-byPublicIdno sensitive capabilitylabel-createno sensitive capabilitylabel-deleteno sensitive capabilitylabel-updateno sensitive capabilitylist-createno sensitive capabilitylist-deleteno sensitive capabilitylist-updateno sensitive capabilitymember-acceptInviteLinkno sensitive capabilitymember-createInviteLinkno sensitive capabilitymember-deactivateInviteLinkno sensitive capabilitymember-deleteno sensitive capabilitymember-getActiveInviteLinkno sensitive capabilitymember-getInviteByCodeno sensitive capabilitymember-inviteno sensitive capabilitymember-updateRoleno sensitive capabilitypermission-getMemberPermissionsno sensitive capabilitypermission-getMyPermissionsno sensitive capabilitypermission-getRolePermissionsno sensitive capabilitypermission-getWorkspaceRolePermissionsno sensitive capabilitypermission-getWorkspaceRolesno sensitive capabilitypermission-grantPermissionno sensitive capabilitypermission-grantRolePermissionno sensitive capabilitypermission-resetMemberPermissionsno sensitive capabilitypermission-resetWorkspaceMemberPermissionsno sensitive capabilitypermission-revokePermissionno sensitive capabilitypermission-revokeRolePermissionno sensitive capabilityuser-getUserno sensitive capabilityuser-setPasswordno sensitive capabilityuser-updateno sensitive capabilityworkspace-allno sensitive capabilityworkspace-byIdno sensitive capabilityworkspace-bySlugno sensitive capabilityworkspace-checkSlugAvailabilityno sensitive capabilityworkspace-createno sensitive capabilityworkspace-deleteno sensitive capabilityworkspace-searchno sensitive capabilityworkspace-updateno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 3
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (79 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.0.1 |
A 93/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v1.0.0 |
C 70/100 | 9 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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