Aicoin MCP Server
@aicoin/aicoin-mcp
npm
v1.5.1
Published by @aicoin — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
AiCoin MCP Server - unified crypto market data & trading via AiCoin API + CCXT
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 12 = 82. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:3930`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { fileURLToPath as fileURLToPath2 } from "url"; import { dirname as dirna
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([news, ft_deploy]) co-exist with external-action tools ([twitter]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [news, ft_deploy] → sinks [twitter]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow news → twitter
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:3971`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const output = execSync( `node ${SCRIPT} ${action}${paramsArg}`, { encoding: "utf-8", timeo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/ft-deploy.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/ft-deploy.mjs:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto'; const FT_DIR = resolve(process.env.H
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/ft-deploy.mjs
Tools 63
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ft_deployingests untrusted inputnewsingests untrusted inputtwitternetwork egressaccount_historyno sensitive capabilityaccount_ordersno sensitive capabilityaccount_statusno sensitive capabilityairdropno sensitive capabilityauto_tradeno sensitive capabilitycancel_orderno sensitive capabilityclose_positionno sensitive capability
Show 53 more tools ↓
coin_funding_rateno sensitive capabilitycoin_futures_datano sensitive capabilitycoin_infono sensitive capabilitycoin_liquidationno sensitive capabilitycoin_open_interestno sensitive capabilitycoin_treasuryno sensitive capabilitycreate_orderno sensitive capabilitycrypto_stockno sensitive capabilitydepthno sensitive capabilitydrop_radarno sensitive capabilityexchange_fundingno sensitive capabilityexchange_infono sensitive capabilityexchange_market_datano sensitive capabilityexchange_tickerno sensitive capabilityflashno sensitive capabilityft_backtestno sensitive capabilityft_balanceno sensitive capabilityft_candlesno sensitive capabilityft_controlno sensitive capabilityft_force_enterno sensitive capabilityft_force_exitno sensitive capabilityft_infono sensitive capabilityft_pairlistno sensitive capabilityft_periodicno sensitive capabilityft_pingno sensitive capabilityft_profitno sensitive capabilityft_statsno sensitive capabilityft_strategyno sensitive capabilityft_trade_actionno sensitive capabilityft_tradesno sensitive capabilityguideno sensitive capabilityhl_advancedno sensitive capabilityhl_fillsno sensitive capabilityhl_liquidationno sensitive capabilityhl_open_interestno sensitive capabilityhl_ordersno sensitive capabilityhl_portfoliono sensitive capabilityhl_positionno sensitive capabilityhl_takerno sensitive capabilityhl_tickerno sensitive capabilityhl_traderno sensitive capabilityhl_whaleno sensitive capabilityindex_datano sensitive capabilityklineno sensitive capabilitymarket_infono sensitive capabilitymarket_overviewno sensitive capabilitynewsflashno sensitive capabilityorder_flowno sensitive capabilityset_trading_configno sensitive capabilitysignal_datano sensitive capabilitysignal_manageno sensitive capabilitytrading_pairno sensitive capabilitytransferno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (63 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.1 latest |
B 82/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @aicoin/aicoin-mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
Signed verification attestations for agent decisions: business, price, freshness, claim checks.
Actual Budget MCP server exposing API functionality
MCP server for Actual Budget - query and manage your personal finances through Claude
The Adyen Model Context Protocol server allows you to integrate with Adyen APIs through LLMs function calling utilizing various Clients. It currently supports the following tools:
Trusted agent-commerce hub: discover, trust-check, and route x402 payments with failover.