Ai Ssh Toolkit — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.9.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.9.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"target": {
"id": "ai-ssh-toolkit",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "ai-ssh-toolkit"
},
"server": {
"name": "ai-ssh-toolkit"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 1.2,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.9"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/credentials/aws-secretsmanager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/credentials/aws-secretsmanager.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/credentials/aws-secretsmanager.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { resolveCliPath } from \"../utils/cli-resolver.js\"; /** Promisified execF",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/credentials/aws-secretsmanager.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/credentials/azure-keyvault.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/credentials/azure-keyvault.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/credentials/azure-keyvault.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { resolveCliPath } from \"../utils/cli-resolver.js\"; /** Promisified execF",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/credentials/azure-keyvault.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/credentials/bitwarden.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/credentials/bitwarden.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/credentials/bitwarden.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { resolveCliPath } from \"../utils/cli-resolver.js\"; /** Promisified execF",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/credentials/bitwarden.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/credentials/google-secret-manager.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/credentials/google-secret-manager.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/credentials/google-secret-manager.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { resolve } from 'path'; const execFile",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/credentials/google-secret-manager.js",
"line": 19,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/credentials/hashicorp-vault.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/credentials/hashicorp-vault.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/credentials/hashicorp-vault.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { resolveCliPath } from \"../utils/cli-resolver.js\"; /** Promisified execF",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/credentials/hashicorp-vault.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/credentials/macos-keychain.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/credentials/macos-keychain.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/credentials/macos-keychain.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { currentPlatform } from \"../utils/platform.js\"; import { resolveCliPath",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/credentials/macos-keychain.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/credentials/onepassword.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/credentials/onepassword.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/credentials/onepassword.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { resolveCliPath } from \"../utils/cli-resolver.js\"; /** Promisified execF",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/credentials/onepassword.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/credentials/ssh-agent.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/credentials/ssh-agent.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/credentials/ssh-agent.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile); /**",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/credentials/ssh-agent.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/credentials/windows-credential.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/credentials/windows-credential.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/credentials/windows-credential.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execFile } from \"child_process\"; import { currentPlatform } from \"../utils/platform.js\"; /** Promisified execFile",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/credentials/windows-credential.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/security/host-key-scanner.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/security/host-key-scanner.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/security/host-key-scanner.js"
},
"evidence": "execFile, spawn } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { resolveCliPath } from '../utils/cli-r",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/security/host-key-scanner.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-INJ-TARGET-1",
"title": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Reference to a credential-exfiltration path in metadata detected in the description of tool \"ssh_list_hosts\". Instruction-like content in tool metadata is executed by the model, not the human, and is the primary tool-poisoning vector.",
"remediation": "Tool descriptions should describe behavior, not instruct the assistant. Treat imperative / secrecy / sequencing language in metadata as hostile.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ssh_list_hosts",
"field": "description"
},
"evidence": "~/.ssh",
"owasp": "LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection",
"data": {
"kind": "sensitive-target"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ssh_execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_multi_execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "credential_get",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "credential_list_backends",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_check_host",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_session_open",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_session_execute",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_session_close",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "credential_diagnose",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "credential_map_reload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_forward_local",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_stream_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_upload",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_forward_remote",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_stream_cancel",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_download",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_forward_dynamic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_forward_close",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_forward_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_stream_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_sftp_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_list_hosts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "version_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_audit_log_read",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_host_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_host_key_trust",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_host_key_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ssh_host_key_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "79cc95d398916094ca58a41d353922d97aaae10a9609713f0e013ab8519fb51d",
"stats": {
"tools": 28,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}