Ai Mind Map MCP Server
ai-mind-map
npm
v1.21.2
Published by shdra06 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AI Mind Map — MCP server that reduces AI coding agent token usage by 80-99% through persistent codebase memory, knowledge graphs, and intelligent context management
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import path from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/smart-tools.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/smart-tools.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs'; import { resolve, relative } from 'node:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/smart-tools.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/knowledge-graph/parser.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/knowledge-graph/parser.js:208`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t grammarModule = await import(grammarPkg); let grammar = grammarModule.default ?? grammarModule;
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/knowledge-graph/parser.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/install.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/install.js:21`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; import path from 'node:path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url'; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/install.js
Tools 66
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
mindmap_list_dirreads sensitive datamindmap_architectureno sensitive capabilitymindmap_batch_readno sensitive capabilitymindmap_change_deltano sensitive capabilitymindmap_changelogno sensitive capabilitymindmap_classify_fileno sensitive capabilitymindmap_code_duplicationno sensitive capabilitymindmap_code_metricsno sensitive capabilitymindmap_compressno sensitive capabilitymindmap_dead_codeno sensitive capability
Show 56 more tools ↓
mindmap_debug_changesno sensitive capabilitymindmap_decideno sensitive capabilitymindmap_deep_exploreno sensitive capabilitymindmap_digestno sensitive capabilitymindmap_explainno sensitive capabilitymindmap_file_beforeno sensitive capabilitymindmap_file_digestno sensitive capabilitymindmap_file_historyno sensitive capabilitymindmap_file_skeletonno sensitive capabilitymindmap_find_fileno sensitive capabilitymindmap_find_referencesno sensitive capabilitymindmap_forgetno sensitive capabilitymindmap_get_code_snippetno sensitive capabilitymindmap_get_contextno sensitive capabilitymindmap_get_decisionsno sensitive capabilitymindmap_get_file_mapno sensitive capabilitymindmap_get_learnedno sensitive capabilitymindmap_get_signatureno sensitive capabilitymindmap_get_structureno sensitive capabilitymindmap_git_changesno sensitive capabilitymindmap_grepno sensitive capabilitymindmap_healthno sensitive capabilitymindmap_hotspotsno sensitive capabilitymindmap_impact_analysisno sensitive capabilitymindmap_interaction_mapno sensitive capabilitymindmap_layer_overviewno sensitive capabilitymindmap_list_projectsno sensitive capabilitymindmap_project_mapno sensitive capabilitymindmap_project_summaryno sensitive capabilitymindmap_query_graphno sensitive capabilitymindmap_read_linesno sensitive capabilitymindmap_recallno sensitive capabilitymindmap_reindexno sensitive capabilitymindmap_rememberno sensitive capabilitymindmap_searchno sensitive capabilitymindmap_search_codeno sensitive capabilitymindmap_security_scanno sensitive capabilitymindmap_semantic_searchno sensitive capabilitymindmap_semantic_statsno sensitive capabilitymindmap_session_diffno sensitive capabilitymindmap_session_endno sensitive capabilitymindmap_session_kickoffno sensitive capabilitymindmap_session_resumeno sensitive capabilitymindmap_session_startno sensitive capabilitymindmap_session_summaryno sensitive capabilitymindmap_set_projectno sensitive capabilitymindmap_smart_searchno sensitive capabilitymindmap_statusno sensitive capabilitymindmap_sync_shared_contextno sensitive capabilitymindmap_synonymsno sensitive capabilitymindmap_teachno sensitive capabilitymindmap_trace_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitymindmap_trace_flowno sensitive capabilitymindmap_verifyno sensitive capabilitymindmap_verify_changesno sensitive capabilitymindmap_what_changedno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (66 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.21.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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