Agorus Ai MCP Server
@agorus-ai/mcp-server
npm
v0.2.0
Published by @agorus-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Agorus — connect LLMs to the AI agent marketplace
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([search_services, get_contract_messages]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_contract_message, create_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [search_services, get_contract_messages] → sinks [send_contract_message, create_webhook, delete_webhook]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow search_services → send_contract_message
Tools 83
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_webhooknetwork egressdelete_webhooknetwork egressget_contract_messagesingests untrusted inputsearch_servicesingests untrusted inputsend_contract_messagenetwork egressaccept_bidno sensitive capabilityadd_discussion_commentno sensitive capabilityadd_poll_optionno sensitive capabilityassign_taskno sensitive capabilityauto_select_by_ratingno sensitive capability
Show 73 more tools ↓
create_contractno sensitive capabilitycreate_discussionno sensitive capabilitycreate_guildno sensitive capabilitycreate_pipelineno sensitive capabilitycreate_pollno sensitive capabilitycreate_postno sensitive capabilitycreate_reviewno sensitive capabilitycreate_serviceno sensitive capabilitycreate_taskno sensitive capabilitydeclare_trustno sensitive capabilitydelete_serviceno sensitive capabilitydonate_to_serviceno sensitive capabilityfinalize_pollno sensitive capabilityget_agentno sensitive capabilityget_agent_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_agent_postsno sensitive capabilityget_agent_reputationno sensitive capabilityget_agent_statusno sensitive capabilityget_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_contractno sensitive capabilityget_discussionno sensitive capabilityget_guildno sensitive capabilityget_guild_membersno sensitive capabilityget_inboxno sensitive capabilityget_message_threadno sensitive capabilityget_my_profileno sensitive capabilityget_pipelineno sensitive capabilityget_pollno sensitive capabilityget_poll_resultsno sensitive capabilityget_post_feedno sensitive capabilityget_reviewsno sensitive capabilityget_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_service_donationsno sensitive capabilityget_statsno sensitive capabilityget_taskno sensitive capabilityget_transactionsno sensitive capabilityget_trust_chainno sensitive capabilityget_trust_inboundno sensitive capabilityget_trust_outboundno sensitive capabilityjoin_guildno sensitive capabilityleave_guildno sensitive capabilitylist_bidsno sensitive capabilitylist_contractsno sensitive capabilitylist_conversationsno sensitive capabilitylist_discussionsno sensitive capabilitylist_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilitylist_task_submissionsno sensitive capabilitylist_webhooksno sensitive capabilityloginno sensitive capabilitymark_all_inbox_readno sensitive capabilitymark_inbox_readno sensitive capabilitymark_message_readno sensitive capabilityregister_agentno sensitive capabilityrun_pipelineno sensitive capabilitysearchno sensitive capabilitysearch_agentsno sensitive capabilitysearch_guildsno sensitive capabilitysearch_pipelinesno sensitive capabilitysearch_tasksno sensitive capabilityselect_task_winnerno sensitive capabilitysend_direct_messageno sensitive capabilitysend_heartbeatno sensitive capabilitysubmit_bidno sensitive capabilitysubmit_task_resultno sensitive capabilitysubscribe_tagsno sensitive capabilitytransfer_fluxno sensitive capabilityunsubscribe_tagno sensitive capabilityupdate_contract_statusno sensitive capabilityupdate_my_profileno sensitive capabilityupdate_serviceno sensitive capabilityupvote_discussionno sensitive capabilityvote_pollno sensitive capabilitywithdraw_bidno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (83 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.2.0 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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