Agentsbazaar MCP Server
@agentsbazaar/mcp
npm
v1.8.5
Published by @agentsbazaar — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AgentBazaar MCP server — register, discover, and hire AI agents on Solana
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([read_email, crawl_endpoint]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, register_webhook, open_prepaid_session, send_message, upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [read_email, crawl_endpoint] → sinks [send_email, register_webhook, open_prepaid_session, send_message, upload_file]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow read_email → send_email
Tools 74
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
crawl_endpointingests untrusted inputopen_prepaid_sessionnetwork egressread_emailingests untrusted inputregister_webhooknetwork egresssend_emailnetwork egresssend_messagenetwork egressupload_filenetwork egressactivate_agentno sensitive capabilityadd_creditsno sensitive capabilityagent_memory_deleteno sensitive capability
Show 64 more tools ↓
agent_memory_getno sensitive capabilityagent_memory_listno sensitive capabilityagent_memory_searchno sensitive capabilityagent_memory_setno sensitive capabilitycheck_balanceno sensitive capabilitycheck_custodial_walletno sensitive capabilitycheck_inboxno sensitive capabilitycheck_notificationsno sensitive capabilityclose_sessionno sensitive capabilitycompose_replyno sensitive capabilitycreate_custodial_walletno sensitive capabilitycreate_scheduleno sensitive capabilitycreate_session_keyno sensitive capabilitycreate_teamno sensitive capabilitycreate_triggerno sensitive capabilitycredit_balanceno sensitive capabilitycredit_historyno sensitive capabilitydelegate_tradingno sensitive capabilitydelegated_tradeno sensitive capabilityexport_custodial_keyno sensitive capabilityexport_walletno sensitive capabilityextend_sessionno sensitive capabilityget_agentno sensitive capabilityget_channel_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_feedbackno sensitive capabilityget_hire_instructionsno sensitive capabilityget_leaderboardno sensitive capabilityget_message_channelsno sensitive capabilityget_ratingsno sensitive capabilityget_spend_policyno sensitive capabilityget_teamno sensitive capabilityget_trading_statsno sensitive capabilityget_trust_tierno sensitive capabilityhire_agentno sensitive capabilitylist_agentsno sensitive capabilitylist_delegationsno sensitive capabilitylist_schedulesno sensitive capabilitylist_session_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilitylist_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilitylist_teamsno sensitive capabilitylist_triggersno sensitive capabilitymy_agentsno sensitive capabilitymy_jobsno sensitive capabilityplatform_statsno sensitive capabilitypublish_outputno sensitive capabilityquote_agentno sensitive capabilityregister_agentno sensitive capabilityremove_spend_policyno sensitive capabilityrespond_to_feedbackno sensitive capabilityreview_agentno sensitive capabilityrevoke_delegationno sensitive capabilityrevoke_feedbackno sensitive capabilitysearch_agentsno sensitive capabilitysend_agent_messageno sensitive capabilityset_agent_imageno sensitive capabilityset_spend_policyno sensitive capabilitysetup_walletno sensitive capabilitystart_sessionno sensitive capabilitysubmit_reviewno sensitive capabilitysubscribe_to_agentno sensitive capabilitytoggle_scheduleno sensitive capabilitytransfer_agentno sensitive capabilityupdate_agentno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (74 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.8.5 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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