Agentsbazaar MCP Server

@agentsbazaar/mcp npm v1.8.5

Published by @agentsbazaar — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([read_email, crawl_endpoint]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_email, register_webhook, open_prepaid_session, send_message, upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [read_email, crawl_endpoint] → sinks [send_email, register_webhook, open_prepaid_session, send_message, upload_file]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow read_email → send_email

Tools 74

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • crawl_endpointingests untrusted input
  • open_prepaid_sessionnetwork egress
  • read_emailingests untrusted input
  • register_webhooknetwork egress
  • send_emailnetwork egress
  • send_messagenetwork egress
  • upload_filenetwork egress
  • activate_agentno sensitive capability
  • add_creditsno sensitive capability
  • agent_memory_deleteno sensitive capability
Show 64 more tools ↓
  • agent_memory_getno sensitive capability
  • agent_memory_listno sensitive capability
  • agent_memory_searchno sensitive capability
  • agent_memory_setno sensitive capability
  • check_balanceno sensitive capability
  • check_custodial_walletno sensitive capability
  • check_inboxno sensitive capability
  • check_notificationsno sensitive capability
  • close_sessionno sensitive capability
  • compose_replyno sensitive capability
  • create_custodial_walletno sensitive capability
  • create_scheduleno sensitive capability
  • create_session_keyno sensitive capability
  • create_teamno sensitive capability
  • create_triggerno sensitive capability
  • credit_balanceno sensitive capability
  • credit_historyno sensitive capability
  • delegate_tradingno sensitive capability
  • delegated_tradeno sensitive capability
  • export_custodial_keyno sensitive capability
  • export_walletno sensitive capability
  • extend_sessionno sensitive capability
  • get_agentno sensitive capability
  • get_channel_messagesno sensitive capability
  • get_feedbackno sensitive capability
  • get_hire_instructionsno sensitive capability
  • get_leaderboardno sensitive capability
  • get_message_channelsno sensitive capability
  • get_ratingsno sensitive capability
  • get_spend_policyno sensitive capability
  • get_teamno sensitive capability
  • get_trading_statsno sensitive capability
  • get_trust_tierno sensitive capability
  • hire_agentno sensitive capability
  • list_agentsno sensitive capability
  • list_delegationsno sensitive capability
  • list_schedulesno sensitive capability
  • list_session_keysno sensitive capability
  • list_sessionsno sensitive capability
  • list_subscriptionsno sensitive capability
  • list_teamsno sensitive capability
  • list_triggersno sensitive capability
  • my_agentsno sensitive capability
  • my_jobsno sensitive capability
  • platform_statsno sensitive capability
  • publish_outputno sensitive capability
  • quote_agentno sensitive capability
  • register_agentno sensitive capability
  • remove_spend_policyno sensitive capability
  • respond_to_feedbackno sensitive capability
  • review_agentno sensitive capability
  • revoke_delegationno sensitive capability
  • revoke_feedbackno sensitive capability
  • search_agentsno sensitive capability
  • send_agent_messageno sensitive capability
  • set_agent_imageno sensitive capability
  • set_spend_policyno sensitive capability
  • setup_walletno sensitive capability
  • start_sessionno sensitive capability
  • submit_reviewno sensitive capability
  • subscribe_to_agentno sensitive capability
  • toggle_scheduleno sensitive capability
  • transfer_agentno sensitive capability
  • update_agentno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.8.5 latest A 96/100 1 1.8.0 2026-07-23

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @agentsbazaar/mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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