Agents Remember MCP Server
agents-remember-mcp
PyPI
v2.9.3
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
Model Context Protocol server for Agents Remember.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/agents_remember/code_quality/check.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/agents_remember/code_quality/check.py:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: Result: completed = subprocess.run( command, cwd=cwd, env=dict(env), stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, check=False
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agents_remember/code_quality/check.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/agents_remember/kernel/git_command.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/agents_remember/kernel/git_command.py:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rocess[str]: return subprocess.run( ["git", "-c", f"safe.directory={repo_root.as_posix()}", *args],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agents_remember/kernel/git_command.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/agents_remember/kernel/git_freshness.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/agents_remember/kernel/git_freshness.py:42`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "-c", f"safe.directory={repo_root.as_posix()}", "fetch", rem
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agents_remember/kernel/git_freshness.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/agents_remember/kernel/memory_init.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/agents_remember/kernel/memory_init.py:44`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: return git result = subprocess.run( ["git", "init"], cwd=memory_root, text=True, std
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agents_remember/kernel/memory_init.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/agents_remember/memory/carryover.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/agents_remember/memory/carryover.py:99`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: VNULL} ) return subprocess.run( ["git", "-c", f"safe.directory={repo.as_posix()}", *args], cwd=r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agents_remember/memory/carryover.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/agents_remember/memory_quality/integrity/check_missing_onboarding.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/agents_remember/memory_quality/integrity/check_missing_onboarding.py:161`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cess[str]: result = subprocess.run( ["git", "-c", f"safe.directory={repo_root.as_posix()}", *args],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agents_remember/memory_quality/integrity/check_missing_onboarding.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/agents_remember/memory_quality/integrity/onboarding_drift_check/git_ops.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/agents_remember/memory_quality/integrity/onboarding_drift_check/git_ops.py:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rocess[str]: return subprocess.run( ["git", "-c", f"safe.directory={repo_root.as_posix()}", *args],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agents_remember/memory_quality/integrity/onboarding_drift_check/git_ops.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/agents_remember/providers/cgc/seed.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/agents_remember/providers/cgc/seed.py:201`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eturn None result = subprocess.run( [ "git", "-c", f"safe.directory={rep
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agents_remember/providers/cgc/seed.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/agents_remember/benchmarks/runner_modules/commands.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/agents_remember/benchmarks/runner_modules/commands.py:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tHub #49). result = subprocess.run( command, cwd=cwd, check=False, stdin=subprocess.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agents_remember/benchmarks/runner_modules/commands.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/agents_remember/benchmarks/runner_modules/execution.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/agents_remember/benchmarks/runner_modules/execution.py:251`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ): completed = subprocess.run( command, input=prompt_text, stdout=stdout,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agents_remember/benchmarks/runner_modules/execution.py
Tools 36
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
cgc_calleesno sensitive capabilitycgc_callersno sensitive capabilitycgc_complexityno sensitive capabilitycgc_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitycgc_symbol_searchno sensitive capabilitycgc_visualizeno sensitive capabilitycodex_benchmark_prepareno sensitive capabilitycodex_benchmark_runno sensitive capabilitycontext_packetno sensitive capabilitydrift_checkno sensitive capability
Show 26 more tools ↓
grepai_searchno sensitive capabilitygrepai_traceno sensitive capabilitymemory_baseline_adoptno sensitive capabilitymemory_baseline_statusno sensitive capabilitymemory_carryover_applyno sensitive capabilitymemory_carryover_planno sensitive capabilitymemory_initno sensitive capabilitymemory_quality_checkno sensitive capabilitypingno sensitive capabilityprovider_diagnosticsno sensitive capabilityprovider_statusno sensitive capabilityprovider_watchersno sensitive capabilityresolve_contextno sensitive capabilityroute_index_refreshno sensitive capabilityruntime_installno sensitive capabilityserver_infono sensitive capabilityskills_installno sensitive capabilityworktree_abandonno sensitive capabilityworktree_attachno sensitive capabilityworktree_cleanupno sensitive capabilityworktree_closeout_applyno sensitive capabilityworktree_closeout_previewno sensitive capabilityworktree_integrateno sensitive capabilityworktree_startno sensitive capabilityworktree_statusno sensitive capabilityworktree_syncno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (36 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.9.3 latest |
A 92/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan agents-remember-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Productivity & Workflow
MCP AgentChat - 让 AI Agent 通过 Telegram 与用户实时交互：发送消息、图片，等待用户回复
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Airthings Air Quality Monitor devices.
MCP server for Anki
TypeScript package for reading and searching Apple Notes on macOS via direct SQLite access. Includes markdown conversion, attachment support, and offers a local MCP server!
Verified biotech catalyst calendar (PDUFA/AdComm/trial readouts) anchored to official sources.
Appointment booking platform letting agents check provider availability and create bookings.