Agentic Store — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.5.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.5.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"target": {
"id": "agentic-store-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "agentic-store-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "agentic-store-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "C",
"score": {
"score": 76,
"grade": "C",
"band": "C",
"gateCap": "C",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 22,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 1,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 22
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
}
],
"gatesFired": [
"1 confirmed high finding → grade capped at C"
],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.4"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": false,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/handler.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/handler.py:114`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/handler.py"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/handler.py",
"line": 114
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/test_handler.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/test_handler.py:53`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/test_handler.py"
},
"evidence": "id_rsa",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/test_handler.py",
"line": 53
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-008",
"title": "Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/test_handler.py)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "confirmed",
"description": "A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/test_handler.py:37`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.",
"remediation": "Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/test_handler.py"
},
"evidence": "AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"secretType": "aws-access-key",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/security/repo_scanner/test_handler.py",
"line": 37
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agentic_store_mcp/firewall/ca_manager.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/firewall/ca_manager.py:33`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/firewall/ca_manager.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/firewall/ca_manager.py",
"line": 33
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agentic_store_mcp/firewall/system_proxy.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/firewall/system_proxy.py:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/firewall/system_proxy.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/firewall/system_proxy.py",
"line": 12
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/codebase_analysis/analyze_commits/handler.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/codebase_analysis/analyze_commits/handler.py:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/codebase_analysis/analyze_commits/handler.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/codebase_analysis/analyze_commits/handler.py",
"line": 16
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/codebase_analysis/analyze_commits/test_handler.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/codebase_analysis/analyze_commits/test_handler.py:48`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/codebase_analysis/analyze_commits/test_handler.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/code/codebase_analysis/analyze_commits/test_handler.py",
"line": 48
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agentic_store_mcp/modules/tools/list_processes/handler.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/modules/tools/list_processes/handler.py:90`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/tools/list_processes/handler.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/modules/tools/list_processes/handler.py",
"line": 90
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agentic_store_mcp/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/server.py:357`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/server.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/server.py",
"line": 357
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agentic_store_mcp/webapp/app.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/webapp/app.py:468`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/webapp/app.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/webapp/app.py",
"line": 468
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agentic_store_mcp/webapp/clients.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/webapp/clients.py:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/webapp/clients.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.Popen(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/webapp/clients.py",
"line": 107
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agentic_store_mcp/webapp/run.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentic_store_mcp/webapp/run.py:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentic_store_mcp/webapp/run.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agentic_store_mcp/webapp/run.py",
"line": 18
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (webapp.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`webapp.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "webapp.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "webapp.py",
"line": 24
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"agentic-store-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "agentic-store-mcp"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [],
"surfaceDigest": "1984c4cea9f079cd763ad4cca7dc7ddb682bf6b8ac9336421dc2ada301095811",
"stats": {
"tools": 0,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 13,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}