Agentibridge — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "agentibridge",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "agentibridge"
},
"server": {
"name": "agentibridge"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (agentibridge/cli.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`agentibridge/cli.py:109`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "agentibridge/cli.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "agentibridge/cli.py",
"line": 109
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_docker.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_docker.py:59`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_docker.py"
},
"evidence": "subprocess.run(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_docker.py",
"line": 59
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_sessions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_session_segment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_session_actions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_sessions",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "agent_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "collect_now",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_semantic",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "restore_session",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dispatch_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_dispatch_job",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_dispatch_jobs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "plan_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_dispatch_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_dispatch_plans",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_handoff_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "handoff",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_memory_files",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_memory_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_plans",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_plan",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "search_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "register_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "deregister_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "heartbeat_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "find_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discover_local_agents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "run_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "dispatch_to_agent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "a3c893a8ee27ad04f28d38192a82890d3ae70cf50a4f0ac1b4cfce3467a4deba",
"stats": {
"tools": 33,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}