Raw scan report

Workflows — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "@agentdesk/workflows-mcp",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "@agentdesk/workflows-mcp"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "@agentdesk/workflows-mcp"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 98,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "minimal",
        "label": "capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "none",
        "label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
        "appliedPenalty": 2
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "minimal",
    "reasons": [],
    "tags": []
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (1 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (__tests__/advanced-parameters-integration.test.ts)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`__tests__/advanced-parameters-integration.test.ts:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "__tests__/advanced-parameters-integration.test.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "dProcess, spawn } from \"child_process\"; import path from \"path\"; import { fileURLToPath } from \"url\"; import { McpTestCl",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "__tests__/advanced-parameters-integration.test.ts",
        "line": 5,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (__tests__/tool-integration.test.ts)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "low",
      "confidence": "heuristic",
      "description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`__tests__/tool-integration.test.ts:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "__tests__/tool-integration.test.ts"
      },
      "evidence": "import { spawn } from \"child_process\"; // Create dirname equivalent for ES modules const __filename = fileURLToPath(im",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "__tests__/tool-integration.test.ts",
        "line": 10,
        "nonRuntime": true
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
      "title": "Package declares no source repository",
      "category": "supply-chain",
      "severity": "info",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "\"@agentdesk/workflows-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
      "remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "package",
        "name": "@agentdesk/workflows-mcp"
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "placeholder",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "540a84543424555a8e604594135b3ac3d86f9c194c8195f7523645bf10a1ecb5",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 1,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 0,
      "medium": 0,
      "low": 2,
      "info": 1
    }
  }
}