Agent Security (mdfifty50-boop) MCP Server

agent-security-mcp npm v0.1.3

Published by mdfifty50-boop — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

Trust grade
D
66/100
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Trust
D · 66/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Minimal
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
D Why this grade threat 67 − adoption risk = 66/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 33 = 67. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−33 Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code ×2 MTC-SRC-008 exfiltration

2. Client adoption risk — 67 − 1 = 66. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Grade capped: 2 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 4

high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (src/__tests__/server.test.js)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `src/__tests__/server.test.js:24`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server src/__tests__/server.test.js

high Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (src/tools/secret-scanner.test.js)MTC-SRC-008

A live-looking AWS access key id is hardcoded in `src/tools/secret-scanner.test.js:22`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.

Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)

Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.

Location: server src/tools/secret-scanner.test.js

low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/tools/prompt-injection.js)MTC-SRC-002

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/tools/prompt-injection.js:187`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: (|subprocess|os\.system|child_process|Runtime\.exec/i, severity: 'high', category: 'tool_manipulation', desc

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/tools/prompt-injection.js

low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/tools/tool-poisoning.js)MTC-SRC-002

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/tools/tool-poisoning.js:79`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: |eval|system|subprocess|child_process|spawn|shell|bash\s+-c|sh\s+-c)/i, severity: 'high', description: 'Tool des

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/tools/tool-poisoning.js

Tools 8

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • audit_agent_permissionsno sensitive capability
  • detect_prompt_injectionno sensitive capability
  • detect_tool_poisoningno sensitive capability
  • generate_security_reportno sensitive capability
  • health_checkno sensitive capability
  • scan_mcp_configno sensitive capability
  • scan_secretsno sensitive capability
  • validate_scope_contractno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.3 latest D 66/100 4 1.8.0 2026-07-23

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MCP Trust Score: D · 66/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan agent-security-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Agent Security 1

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →

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