Agent Readiness (PyPI) MCP Server
agent-readiness-mcp
PyPI
v0.8.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server exposing agent-readiness scan, detect, and apply tools to coding agents.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/agent_readiness_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/agent_readiness_mcp/server.py:149`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: subprocess proc = subprocess.run( ["agent-readiness", "scan-repo", path, "--json", "--no-open"], c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/agent_readiness_mcp/server.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_manifest_tools.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_manifest_tools.py:83`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: NNER_SRC) cli_raw = subprocess.check_output( [sys.executable, "-m", "agent_readiness.cli", "manifes
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_manifest_tools.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_workspace_tools.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_workspace_tools.py:83`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ) cli_output = subprocess.run( ["python3", "-m", "agent_readiness.cli", "enumerate", str(tmp_p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_workspace_tools.py
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
apply_top_action_toolno sensitive capabilityask_clarification_toolno sensitive capabilitycheck_workspace_readiness_toolno sensitive capabilityconfirm_apply_toolno sensitive capabilitydetect_workspace_toolno sensitive capabilityenumerate_workspace_toolno sensitive capabilityget_scan_status_toolno sensitive capabilityinspect_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_friction_toolno sensitive capabilitylist_scans_toolno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
log_assumption_toolno sensitive capabilitymanifest_validate_toolno sensitive capabilityontology_toolno sensitive capabilityrecord_gap_toolno sensitive capabilityrender_workspace_report_toolno sensitive capabilityscan_monorepo_toolno sensitive capabilityscan_repo_toolno sensitive capabilityscan_workspace_async_toolno sensitive capabilityscan_workspace_toolno sensitive capabilitystop_scan_toolno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.8.0 latest |
A 92/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan agent-readiness-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Agent Readiness 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
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