Agent Quality Loop MCP Server
agent-quality-loop
npm
v2.3.1
Published by your-org — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 11.7 = 88. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −11.7 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×4 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 88 − 7 = 81. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 19
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/checks/aiAnalysis.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/aiAnalysis.js:501`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: MISUSE — look for: • eval() or new Function() with user-controlled or dynamic input • Prototype pollution via obj[u
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/aiAnalysis.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/config/defaults.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/config/defaults.js:5`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: description: "Disallow eval() — code injection risk", severity: "error", pattern: "\\beval\\s*\\(",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/config/defaults.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/checks/aiAnalysis.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/aiAnalysis.js:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: /\bexec\s*\(/, /child_process/, /\.query\s*\(\s*[`'"].*\$\{/, // template-literal SQL /require\s*\(\s*[^
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/aiAnalysis.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/checks/dependabot.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/dependabot.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; const SEVERITY_ORDER = ["critical", "high", "medium", "low"]; const GITHUB_API =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/dependabot.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/checks/eslint.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/eslint.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { join, relative } from "path"; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/eslint.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/checks/npmAudit.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/npmAudit.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; const SEVERITY_ORDER = ["critical", "high", "mo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/npmAudit.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/checks/ollamaManager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/ollamaManager.js:16`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { get as httpsGet } from "https"; import { get as httpGet } from "http";
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/ollamaManager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/checks/prettier.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/prettier.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { join, relative } from "path"; /** * R
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/prettier.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/checks/traceCode.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/traceCode.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "fs"; import { join, relative, basename
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/traceCode.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/checks/typescript.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/typescript.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { join, relative } from "path"; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/typescript.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/checkSetup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/checkSetup.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { loadConfig } from "../config/loader.js"; import { stackLabel } from "..
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/checkSetup.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/identifyTraceCode.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/identifyTraceCode.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { relative } from "path"; import { globS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/identifyTraceCode.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/checks/aiAnalysis.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/aiAnalysis.js:221`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const response = await fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/aiAnalysis.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/cli/configure.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/configure.js:50`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://api.groq.com/openai/v1/models", { headers: { Authorization: `Bearer $
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/configure.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/tools/checkSetup.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/checkSetup.js:21`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", { method: "POST",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/checkSetup.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/checks/eslint.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/eslint.js:29`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { stdout = execSync(`"${eslintBin}" --format json ${configFlag} ${extraArgs} ${fileList}`, { cwd, encoding:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/eslint.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/checks/prettier.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/prettier.js:27`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`"${prettierBin}" --check "${absPath}"`, { cwd, encodin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/prettier.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/checks/traceCode.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/traceCode.js:88`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = ""; try { execSync(`"${tscBin}" --noEmit --pretty false --noUnusedLocals --noUnusedParameters -p "${tsconf
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/traceCode.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/checks/typescript.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/checks/typescript.js:25`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = ""; try { execSync(`"${tscBin}" --noEmit --pretty false ${extraArgs} -p "${tsconfigPath}"`, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/checks/typescript.js
Tools 7
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
check_setupno sensitive capabilityexplain_blockersno sensitive capabilityidentify_trace_codeno sensitive capabilityreview_changed_filesno sensitive capabilityreview_workspace_policyno sensitive capabilitysetup_repono sensitive capabilityverify_trace_removalno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.3.1 latest |
B 81/100 | 19 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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