Raw scan report

Agent Orchestration — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.

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{
  "tool": {
    "name": "mcptrustchecker",
    "version": "1.13.0",
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "target": {
    "id": "agent-orchestration",
    "source": {
      "kind": "package",
      "origin": "agent-orchestration"
    },
    "server": {
      "name": "agent-orchestration"
    }
  },
  "grade": "A",
  "score": {
    "score": 93,
    "threatScore": 100,
    "grade": "A",
    "band": "A",
    "categorySubtotals": {
      "injection": 0,
      "exfiltration": 0,
      "permissions": 0,
      "supply-chain": 0,
      "network": 0,
      "hygiene": 0
    },
    "vector": [
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "capability-exposure",
        "level": "high",
        "label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
        "appliedPenalty": 6
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "verification-discount",
        "level": "repo",
        "label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
        "appliedPenalty": 1
      },
      {
        "kind": "client",
        "term": "coverage-honesty",
        "level": "source",
        "label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
        "appliedPenalty": 0
      }
    ],
    "gatesFired": [],
    "methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
  },
  "capability": {
    "level": "high",
    "reasons": [
      "can execute shell commands or code"
    ],
    "tags": [
      "code-exec"
    ]
  },
  "coverage": {
    "level": "source",
    "inputs": {
      "toolSurface": true,
      "implementationSource": true,
      "packageMetadata": true,
      "liveTransport": false
    },
    "caveats": [
      "Tools were statically extracted from the published source (35 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
    ]
  },
  "findings": [
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bin/cursorCommands.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/cursorCommands.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/bin/cursorCommands.js"
      },
      "evidence": "import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { getDatabase } from '../database.js'; import { CursorProvider, getCursor",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/bin/cursorCommands.js",
        "line": 1,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    },
    {
      "ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
      "title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/subprocess.js)",
      "category": "permissions",
      "severity": "high",
      "confidence": "strong",
      "description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/subprocess.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
      "remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
      "location": {
        "kind": "server",
        "name": "dist/utils/subprocess.js"
      },
      "evidence": "pawn, spawnSync } from 'child_process'; export function runCommand(command, args, options) { const result = spawnSyn",
      "owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
      "data": {
        "rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
        "file": "dist/utils/subprocess.js",
        "line": 3,
        "nonRuntime": false
      }
    }
  ],
  "toxicFlows": [],
  "capabilities": [
    {
      "tool": "agent_register",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "agent_heartbeat",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "agent_list",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "agent_unregister",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "agent_whoami",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "lock_acquire",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "lock_release",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "lock_check",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "coordination_status",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "event_list",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "memory_set",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "memory_get",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "memory_list",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "memory_delete",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "cursor_task_status",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "cursor_check",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "cursor_delegate_task",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "cursor_resume_task",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "cursor_sync_task",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "cursor_handoff_task",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "cursor_recover_task",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "task_generate_doc",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "cursor_list_delegations",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "research_ready",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "research_status",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "research_query",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "research_checklist",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "task_create",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "task_claim",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "task_update",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "task_complete",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "task_list",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "is_my_turn",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "bootstrap",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    },
    {
      "tool": "claim_todo",
      "tags": [],
      "reasons": {}
    }
  ],
  "surfaceDigest": "6c0f062c561325b8c3cf5d76adc2dfa401789f2e5d66abbc7cbe3b0eeca8e6af",
  "stats": {
    "tools": 35,
    "prompts": 0,
    "resources": 0,
    "findingsBySeverity": {
      "critical": 0,
      "high": 2,
      "medium": 0,
      "low": 0,
      "info": 0
    }
  }
}