Agent Memory Engine — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "agent-memory-engine",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "agent-memory-engine"
},
"server": {
"name": "agent-memory-engine"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 99,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "minimal",
"label": "capability blast radius (minimal) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "minimal",
"reasons": [],
"tags": []
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (11 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_remote_backend.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_remote_backend.py:202`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "tests/test_remote_backend.py"
},
"evidence": "} ) build = subprocess.run( [\"go\", \"build\", \"-o\", str(binary_path), \"./cmd/server\"], cwd=go_",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "tests/test_remote_backend.py",
"line": 202,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "memory_store",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_ingest_conversation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_trace",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_health",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_audit",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_evolution",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_update",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_maintain",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "memory_export",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "ab28136fc3ddc2e8fdde928d2d326de554084cd7d7c152bca027f0fd257fb446",
"stats": {
"tools": 11,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 0,
"medium": 0,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}