Agent Fleet — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.7.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.7.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"target": {
"id": "agent-fleet",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "agent-fleet"
},
"server": {
"name": "agent-fleet"
}
},
"grade": "F",
"score": {
"score": 48,
"threatScore": 63,
"grade": "F",
"band": "F",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 23.1,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 11.66,
"supply-chain": 2.1,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 1.58
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.1,
"appliedPenalty": 0.63
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 15.4
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 22,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 7.7
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 2.1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlocatable) — no provenance and no public repository to inspect",
"appliedPenalty": 5
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.7"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (85 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: coda_get_page ⇒ gmail_create_draft → coda_create_webhook. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "coda_get_page → gmail_create_draft → coda_create_webhook"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"fetch_data",
"coda_get_page"
],
"sources": [
"gmail_send",
"gmail_create_draft",
"slack_upload_file"
],
"sinks": [
"coda_create_webhook",
"coda_delete_webhook",
"coda_trigger_automation",
"linear_create_issue",
"slack_send_message",
"slack_upload_file"
],
"path": [
"coda_get_page",
"gmail_create_draft",
"coda_create_webhook"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "coda_get_page",
"to": "gmail_create_draft",
"kind": "schema-wired"
},
{
"from": "gmail_create_draft",
"to": "coda_create_webhook",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-003",
"title": "Read-and-egress in one tool: \"slack_upload_file\"",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"slack_upload_file\" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.",
"remediation": "Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "slack_upload_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py:72`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py",
"line": 72
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py:40`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py",
"line": 40
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:6677`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "Function(`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 6677
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2444`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "Function(`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 2444
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py:72`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py",
"line": 72
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py:40`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py"
},
"evidence": "eval(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py",
"line": 40
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (memory/tool-templates/data-transformer/data-transformer-tool.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`memory/tool-templates/data-transformer/data-transformer-tool.ts:396`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "memory/tool-templates/data-transformer/data-transformer-tool.ts"
},
"evidence": "new Function(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "memory/tool-templates/data-transformer/data-transformer-tool.ts",
"line": 396
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts:147`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts"
},
"evidence": "Function(`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts",
"line": 147
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/tools/built-in/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/built-in/index.ts:144`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/built-in/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "Function(`",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/tools/built-in/index.ts",
"line": 144
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2020`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 2020
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2316`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 2316
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts",
"line": 3
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agents/agent-repository-manager.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agents/agent-repository-manager.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agents/agent-repository-manager.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agents/agent-repository-manager.ts",
"line": 1
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/git/git-manager.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/git/git-manager.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/git/git-manager.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/git/git-manager.ts",
"line": 1
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp/mcp-bundler.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp/mcp-bundler.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp/mcp-bundler.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp/mcp-bundler.ts",
"line": 3
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/built-in/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/built-in/index.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/built-in/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/built-in/index.ts",
"line": 3
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/web/server.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/web/server.ts:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/web/server.ts"
},
"evidence": "child_process",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/web/server.ts",
"line": 13
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/web/server.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/web/server.ts:136`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/web/server.ts"
},
"evidence": "fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token'",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/web/server.ts",
"line": 136
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-007",
"title": "Unconstrained URL/host parameter \"endpoint\" on \"coda_create_webhook\"",
"category": "network",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"coda_create_webhook\" takes a URL/host parameter \"endpoint\" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).",
"remediation": "Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "coda_create_webhook",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.endpoint"
},
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"data": {
"param": "endpoint"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2112`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 2112
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (packages/runtime/src/utils.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/runtime/src/utils.ts:54`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/runtime/src/utils.ts"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "packages/runtime/src/utils.ts",
"line": 54
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (src/commands/template.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/commands/template.ts:343`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/commands/template.ts"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "src/commands/template.ts",
"line": 343
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-007",
"title": "Unsafe deserialization (src/git/git-manager.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/git/git-manager.ts:131`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/git/git-manager.ts"
},
"evidence": "yaml.load(",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-007",
"file": "src/git/git-manager.ts",
"line": 131
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filename\" on \"gmail_send\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"gmail_send\" takes a path parameter \"filename\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gmail_send",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filename"
},
"data": {
"param": "filename"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"gmail_send\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"gmail_send\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gmail_send",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"filename\" on \"gmail_create_draft\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"gmail_create_draft\" takes a path parameter \"filename\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gmail_create_draft",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.filename"
},
"data": {
"param": "filename"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"gmail_create_draft\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"gmail_create_draft\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "gmail_create_draft",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"file_path\" on \"slack_upload_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"slack_upload_file\" takes a path parameter \"file_path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "slack_upload_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.file_path"
},
"data": {
"param": "file_path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package has no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"agent-fleet\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "agent-fleet"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"fetch_data",
"coda_get_page"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"gmail_send",
"gmail_create_draft",
"slack_upload_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"coda_create_webhook",
"coda_delete_webhook",
"coda_trigger_automation",
"linear_create_issue",
"slack_send_message",
"slack_upload_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"coda_get_page",
"gmail_create_draft",
"coda_create_webhook"
],
"pathWired": true,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: coda_get_page ⇒ gmail_create_draft → coda_create_webhook."
},
{
"id": "flow-2",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"slack_upload_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"slack_upload_file"
],
"selfContained": true,
"description": "Tool \"slack_upload_file\" both reads sensitive data and can send it externally."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "calculate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch_data",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "process_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calculate_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "health_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_list_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_get_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_create_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_update_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_delete_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_list_tables",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_get_table",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_get_table_columns",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_get_column",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_list_rows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_get_row",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_insert_rows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_update_row",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_delete_rows",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_list_pages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_get_page",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"get_page\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "coda_create_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_update_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_delete_page",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_list_formulas",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_get_formula",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_list_controls",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_get_control",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_push_button",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_list_webhooks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_create_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\"",
"parameter \"endpoint\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "coda_delete_webhook",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "coda_trigger_automation",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"webhook\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gmail_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gmail_send",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gmail_create_draft",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "gmail_get_attachments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_list_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_create_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_update_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_delete_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_list_calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calendar_create_meeting",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "google_authenticate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "meet_list_conference_records",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "meet_get_transcript",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "meet_list_transcripts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "meet_get_recording",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "meet_list_recordings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "meet_list_transcript_entries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_list_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_get_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_create_issue",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"create_issue\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "linear_update_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_delete_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_search_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_list_projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_get_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_create_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_update_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_add_issue_to_project",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_list_teams",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_get_team",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_list_team_issues",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_list_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_get_current_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_get_user",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_add_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_list_comments",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_update_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_delete_comment",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_list_workflow_states",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_move_issue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_list_labels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_add_label",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_list_cycles",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_get_current_cycle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "linear_add_issue_to_cycle",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_send_message",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"send_message\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_channels",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_messages",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_get_users",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "slack_upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload\""
],
"sensitive-source": [
"parameter \"path\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "slack_authenticate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "562392656efbf3414a20d4fddb9275d51963708ca88bf523adc9f1ae08bfd911",
"stats": {
"tools": 85,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 18,
"medium": 6,
"low": 6,
"info": 0
}
}
}