Agent Fleet — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "agent-fleet",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "agent-fleet"
},
"server": {
"name": "agent-fleet"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (85 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py:72`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py"
},
"evidence": "umexpr result = eval(request.expression, {\"__builtins__\": {}}, {}) if isinstance(result, (int,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py",
"line": 72,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-010",
"title": "Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py:40`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py"
},
"evidence": "n only result = eval(expression, {\"__builtins__\": {}}, {}) return json.dumps({ \"success\": Tr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-010",
"file": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py",
"line": 40,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:6677`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "{ const result = Function(`\"use strict\"; return (${expression})`)(); return { success: true, result };",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 6677,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2444`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "{ const result = Function(`\"use strict\"; return (${expression})`)(); return { success: true, result };",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 2444,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py:72`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py"
},
"evidence": "umexpr result = eval(request.expression, {\"__builtins__\": {}}, {}) if isinstance(result, (int,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/fastmcp_server.py",
"line": 72,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py:40`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py"
},
"evidence": "n only result = eval(expression, {\"__builtins__\": {}}, {}) return json.dumps({ \"success\": Tr",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "example-mcp-servers/example-python/server.py",
"line": 40,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (memory/tool-templates/data-transformer/data-transformer-tool.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`memory/tool-templates/data-transformer/data-transformer-tool.ts:396`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "memory/tool-templates/data-transformer/data-transformer-tool.ts"
},
"evidence": "try { const fn = new Function('data', customFunction); return fn(data); } catch (error: any) { throw ne",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "memory/tool-templates/data-transformer/data-transformer-tool.ts",
"line": 396,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts:147`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ const result = Function(`\"use strict\"; return (${expression})`)(); return { success: true, result };",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts",
"line": 147,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (src/tools/built-in/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/built-in/index.ts:144`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/built-in/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "{ const result = Function(`\"use strict\"; return (${expression})`)(); return { success: true, result };",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "src/tools/built-in/index.ts",
"line": 144,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:2020`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/cli.js"
},
"evidence": "{ exec as exec2 } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify as promisify2 } from \"util\"; import { readFile as readFile5,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/cli.js",
"line": 2020,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2316`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from \"child_process\"; import { promisify } from \"util\"; import { readFile as readFile3, writeFile as w",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 2316,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { readFile, writeFile, readdir } from '",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "packages/runtime/src/built-in-tools.ts",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/agents/agent-repository-manager.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/agents/agent-repository-manager.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/agents/agent-repository-manager.ts"
},
"evidence": "import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { writeFile, access, mkdir, cp } from '",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/agents/agent-repository-manager.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/git/git-manager.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/git/git-manager.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/git/git-manager.ts"
},
"evidence": "import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { readFile, access, readdir, stat } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/git/git-manager.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/mcp/mcp-bundler.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/mcp/mcp-bundler.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/mcp/mcp-bundler.ts"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import type { MCPServerConfig } from '../types",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/mcp/mcp-bundler.ts",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/tools/built-in/index.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/tools/built-in/index.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/tools/built-in/index.ts"
},
"evidence": "; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { readFile, writeFile, readdir } from '",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/tools/built-in/index.ts",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/web/server.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/web/server.ts:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/web/server.ts"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import type { AgentManifest } from '../types/index.js'; import dotenv from 'dote",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/web/server.ts",
"line": 13,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-005",
"title": "Untrusted input can drive an external action",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Untrusted-input tools ([fetch_data, coda_get_page]) co-exist with external-action tools ([coda_create_webhook, coda_delete_webhook, coda_trigger_automation, linear_create_issue, slack_send_message, slack_upload_file]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.",
"remediation": "Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "fetch_data → coda_create_webhook"
},
"evidence": "untrusted [fetch_data, coda_get_page] → sinks [coda_create_webhook, coda_delete_webhook, coda_trigger_automation, linear_create_issue, slack_send_message, slack",
"owasp": "LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"fetch_data",
"coda_get_page"
],
"sinks": [
"coda_create_webhook",
"coda_delete_webhook",
"coda_trigger_automation",
"linear_create_issue",
"slack_send_message",
"slack_upload_file"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/web/server.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/web/server.ts:136`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/web/server.ts"
},
"evidence": "const response = await fetch('https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token', { method: 'POST', headers: { 'C",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/web/server.ts",
"line": 136,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"agent-fleet\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "agent-fleet"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"fetch_data",
"coda_get_page"
],
"sensitiveSource": [],
"externalSink": [
"coda_create_webhook",
"coda_delete_webhook",
"coda_trigger_automation",
"linear_create_issue",
"slack_send_message",
"slack_upload_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"description": "Untrusted input can drive an external action even though no sensitive source is exposed."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "calculate",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch_data",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "process_file",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_items",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "calculate_metrics",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "health_check",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_list_docs",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_get_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "coda_create_doc",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
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