Agent Coord MCP Server
agent-coord-mcp
npm
v0.26.17
Published by davidbalzan — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
File-backed MCP server for coordinating multiple AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Cline, etc.). Local stdio or networked over Streamable HTTP.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/server-identity.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/server-identity.js:23`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import path from "node:path"; import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"; import {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/server-identity.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/board-ref.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/board-ref.js:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; const git = (repo, args) => { try { return execFileSync("git", args,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/board-ref.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/record-events.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/record-events.js:27`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { newlyTickedInDiff, parseWorkDoc, queueItemsOf, doneEntriesOf, hasCommit
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/record-events.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/records.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/records.js:14`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs"; import path f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/records.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/rotate.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/rotate.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import path from "node:path"; import { z } from "zod"; import { ROOT } from "../
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/rotate.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/scopes.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/scopes.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync } from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"; import { z }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/scopes.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/stall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/stall.js:19`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import path from "node:path"; import { z } from "zod"; import { parseWorkDoc, wo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/stall.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/transport.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/transport.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { registerTool } from "./registry.js"; import { roleInputSchema } from ".
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/transport.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/worktrees.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/worktrees.js:15`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, realpathSync } from "node:fs"; import path from "node:path"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/worktrees.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (hooks/tmux-pusher.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`hooks/tmux-pusher.mjs:100`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from "node:child_process"; import { effectiveTier, isGateRunnerRole, TierQueue, formatBatch } from "./tier.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server hooks/tmux-pusher.mjs
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 10
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.26.17 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.26.14 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.26.12 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v0.26.5 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v0.26.2 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-28 |
Show 5 more versions ↓
v0.26.0 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-27 |
v0.25.5 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.25.4 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-24 |
v0.25.2 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-22 |
v0.25.1 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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