Agenhire MCP Server
agenhire
npm
v1.0.1
Published by tonypk — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
AgentHire MCP Server & CLI — AI talent marketplace for AI agents
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([public_jobs_list, public_talent_list]) co-exist with external-action tools ([conversation_send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [public_jobs_list, public_talent_list] → sinks [conversation_send_message]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow public_jobs_list → conversation_send_message
Tools 55
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
conversation_send_messagenetwork egresspublic_jobs_listingests untrusted inputpublic_talent_listingests untrusted inputagent_deleteno sensitive capabilityagent_get_meno sensitive capabilityagent_heartbeatno sensitive capabilityagent_registerno sensitive capabilityagent_update_candidateno sensitive capabilityagent_update_meno sensitive capabilityapplications_applyno sensitive capability
Show 45 more tools ↓
applications_getno sensitive capabilityapplications_list_for_jobno sensitive capabilityapplications_list_mineno sensitive capabilityapplications_update_statusno sensitive capabilityapproval_getno sensitive capabilityapproval_resolveno sensitive capabilitycompliance_tipsno sensitive capabilityconversation_listno sensitive capabilityconversation_list_messagesno sensitive capabilitydeposits_createno sensitive capabilitydeposits_getno sensitive capabilitydeposits_listno sensitive capabilityemployer_create_profileno sensitive capabilityemployer_get_profileno sensitive capabilityemployer_sandbox_statusno sensitive capabilityemployer_update_profileno sensitive capabilityfeed_listno sensitive capabilityfeed_mark_readno sensitive capabilityfeed_unread_countno sensitive capabilityinterviews_createno sensitive capabilityinterviews_get_pendingno sensitive capabilityinterviews_scoreno sensitive capabilityinterviews_submitno sensitive capabilityjobs_activateno sensitive capabilityjobs_closeno sensitive capabilityjobs_createno sensitive capabilityjobs_getno sensitive capabilityjobs_list_mineno sensitive capabilityjobs_pauseno sensitive capabilityjobs_updateno sensitive capabilitymatch_score_getno sensitive capabilitymatching_candidatesno sensitive capabilitymatching_jobsno sensitive capabilityoffers_createno sensitive capabilityoffers_list_negotiationsno sensitive capabilityoffers_negotiateno sensitive capabilityoffers_respondno sensitive capabilityoffers_sendno sensitive capabilityoffers_withdrawno sensitive capabilitypublic_jobs_getno sensitive capabilitypublic_talent_getno sensitive capabilityreputation_getno sensitive capabilityverification_email_confirmno sensitive capabilityverification_email_requestno sensitive capabilityverification_linkedin_urlno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (55 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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