Ae (npm) MCP Server
ae-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Adobe After Effects — AI-powered motion design editing
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 8 = 83. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "execute_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_script
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bridge/applescript.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/bridge/applescript.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { writeFileSync, readFileSync, unlinkSync, existsSync, mkdirSync } from "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bridge/applescript.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/visual-feedback.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/visual-feedback.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto"; import { JSX_JSON_POLYFILL } from "../
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/visual-feedback.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/bridge/applescript.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/bridge/applescript.js:37`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const result = execSync(`osascript -e 'tell application "${appName}" to return name'`, { timeout: 10000, encodi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/bridge/applescript.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/visual-feedback.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/visual-feedback.js:136`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`sips --resampleWidth 800 --setProperty format jpeg --setProperty formatOptions 60 "${a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/visual-feedback.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "execute_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_script · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "execute_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_script
low Dynamic code execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/scripts/jsx-polyfill.js)MTC-SRC-001
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/scripts/jsx-polyfill.js:33`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: function(str) { return eval("(" + str + ")"); }; } `; /** * Standard wrapper that writes script output to a JSON file.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/scripts/jsx-polyfill.js
Tools 61
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
execute_scriptruns code / shelladd_effectno sensitive capabilityadd_keyframesno sensitive capabilityadd_markerno sensitive capabilityadd_speed_rampno sensitive capabilityadd_text_animatorno sensitive capabilityadd_to_render_queueno sensitive capabilityanalyze_audiono sensitive capabilityapply_animation_presetno sensitive capabilityapply_camera_shakeno sensitive capability
Show 51 more tools ↓
apply_chromatic_aberrationno sensitive capabilityapply_color_gradeno sensitive capabilityapply_expression_presetno sensitive capabilityapply_transitionno sensitive capabilitycenter_layerno sensitive capabilitycreate_compositionno sensitive capabilitycreate_layerno sensitive capabilitycreate_maskno sensitive capabilitydelete_layerno sensitive capabilityduplicate_compositionno sensitive capabilityduplicate_layerno sensitive capabilityenable_time_remapno sensitive capabilityexport_with_media_encoderno sensitive capabilityformat_textno sensitive capabilityget_available_fontsno sensitive capabilityget_comp_infono sensitive capabilityget_comp_snapshotno sensitive capabilityget_effect_infono sensitive capabilityget_keyframesno sensitive capabilityget_layer_infono sensitive capabilityget_markersno sensitive capabilityget_mask_infono sensitive capabilityget_project_infono sensitive capabilityget_project_itemsno sensitive capabilityget_render_queueno sensitive capabilityget_timeline_stateno sensitive capabilityimport_fileno sensitive capabilitymodify_compositionno sensitive capabilitymodify_effectno sensitive capabilitymodify_layerno sensitive capabilitymodify_maskno sensitive capabilityparent_layerno sensitive capabilityprecomposeno sensitive capabilityremove_effectno sensitive capabilityremove_expressionno sensitive capabilityremove_keyframesno sensitive capabilityremove_markersno sensitive capabilityremove_maskno sensitive capabilityrender_frameno sensitive capabilityrender_multi_frameno sensitive capabilityreorder_layersno sensitive capabilityreplace_footageno sensitive capabilityset_active_compositionno sensitive capabilityset_blending_modeno sensitive capabilityset_easingno sensitive capabilityset_expressionno sensitive capabilityset_text_contentno sensitive capabilityset_track_matteno sensitive capabilitystart_renderno sensitive capabilitytoggle_effectno sensitive capabilitytransform_layerno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (61 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
B 83/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan ae-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Ae 1
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