Ado (raboley) MCP Server
ado-mcp
PyPI
v0.0.1
Published by raboley — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
An MCP server for Azure DevOps pipelines.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (ado/auth.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ado/auth.py:142`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ID result = subprocess.run( [ "az", "account",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ado/auth.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (ado/client.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`ado/client.py:222`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ID result = subprocess.run( [ "az", "account",
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server ado/client.py
Tools 58
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_work_item_commentno sensitive capabilityanalyze_pipeline_inputno sensitive capabilitycheck_ado_authenticationno sensitive capabilitycreate_pipelineno sensitive capabilitycreate_work_itemno sensitive capabilitydelete_pipelineno sensitive capabilitydelete_work_itemno sensitive capabilitydelete_work_items_batchno sensitive capabilityfind_pipeline_by_id_and_nameno sensitive capabilityfind_pipeline_by_nameno sensitive capability
Show 48 more tools ↓
find_project_by_id_or_nameno sensitive capabilityget_build_by_idno sensitive capabilityget_failed_step_logsno sensitive capabilityget_log_content_by_idno sensitive capabilityget_my_work_itemsno sensitive capabilityget_pipelineno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_failure_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_failure_summary_by_nameno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_runno sensitive capabilityget_pipeline_timelineno sensitive capabilityget_process_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_project_process_idno sensitive capabilityget_project_process_infono sensitive capabilityget_project_suggestionsno sensitive capabilityget_recent_work_itemsno sensitive capabilityget_work_itemno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_commentsno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_historyno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_relationsno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_templateno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_templatesno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_typeno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_type_fieldno sensitive capabilityget_work_item_type_fieldsno sensitive capabilityget_work_items_batchno sensitive capabilityget_work_items_pageno sensitive capabilitylink_work_itemsno sensitive capabilitylist_all_projects_with_metadatano sensitive capabilitylist_area_pathsno sensitive capabilitylist_available_pipelinesno sensitive capabilitylist_iteration_pathsno sensitive capabilitylist_pipeline_logsno sensitive capabilitylist_pipelinesno sensitive capabilitylist_processesno sensitive capabilitylist_projectsno sensitive capabilitylist_service_connectionsno sensitive capabilitylist_work_item_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_work_itemsno sensitive capabilitypreview_pipelineno sensitive capabilityquery_work_itemsno sensitive capabilityresolve_pipeline_from_urlno sensitive capabilityrun_pipelineno sensitive capabilityrun_pipeline_and_get_outcomeno sensitive capabilityrun_pipeline_and_get_outcome_by_nameno sensitive capabilityrun_pipeline_by_nameno sensitive capabilityset_ado_organizationno sensitive capabilityupdate_work_itemno sensitive capabilityupdate_work_items_batchno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan ado-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Ado 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
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