Activitypub — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "activitypub-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "activitypub-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "activitypub-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/auth/login/browser.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/auth/login/browser.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/auth/login/browser.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; export function openBrowser(url) { return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/auth/login/browser.js",
"line": 10,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list-accounts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "switch-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "verify-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "post-status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "reply-to-post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "delete-post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "boost-post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unboost-post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "favourite-post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unfavourite-post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "bookmark-post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unbookmark-post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "follow-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unfollow-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "mute-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unmute-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "block-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "unblock-account",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-home-timeline",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-notifications",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-bookmarks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-favourites",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-relationship",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "vote-on-poll",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "upload-media",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-scheduled-posts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "cancel-scheduled-post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update-scheduled-post",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discover-actor",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "fetch-timeline",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get-instance-info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "discover-instances",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-post-thread",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get-trending-hashtags",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-trending-posts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-public-timeline",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "02497634bebf69784bc6c5a6e6da042666721de664d03f78148480e83ba896ec",
"stats": {
"tools": 37,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 0,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}