@aborruso/ckan-mcp-server
npm
v0.4.124
Source verified
Published by ondata — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for interacting with CKAN open data portals
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: ckan_list_resources → ckan_datastore_search_sql → ckan_list_resources. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow ckan_list_resources → ckan_datastore_search_sql → ckan_list_resources
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:820`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const undiciMod = await import(undiciSpecifier); return new undiciMod.Agent({ connect: { lookup: createSsrfSafeL
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ckan_list_resourcesingests untrusted inputnetwork egressckan_datastore_search_sqlreads sensitive datackan_package_showingests untrusted inputckan_analyze_datasetsno sensitive capabilityckan_catalog_statsno sensitive capabilityckan_datastore_searchno sensitive capabilityckan_find_portalsno sensitive capabilityckan_find_relevant_datasetsno sensitive capabilityckan_get_mqa_qualityno sensitive capabilityckan_get_mqa_quality_detailsno sensitive capabilityckan_group_listno sensitive capabilityckan_group_searchno sensitive capabilityckan_group_showno sensitive capabilityckan_organization_listno sensitive capabilityckan_organization_searchno sensitive capabilityckan_organization_showno sensitive capabilityckan_package_searchno sensitive capabilityckan_status_showno sensitive capabilityckan_tag_listno sensitive capabilitysparql_queryno sensitive capabilityCross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.124 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.4.123 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-06 |
v0.4.119 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-05 |
v0.4.118 |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-20 |
v0.4.117 |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-06 |
v0.4.115 |
A 94/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
v0.4.114 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v0.4.112 |
B 88/100 | 2 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-31 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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