Bolna MCP Server
@abhinavyadav/bolna-mcp
npm
v1.0.7
Published by @abhinavyadav — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for the Bolna Voice AI platform — manage agents, calls, batches, knowledgebases, and phone numbers through natural language
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([bolna_get_execution_raw_logs]) co-exist with external-action tools ([bolna_create_agent, bolna_update_agent, bolna_patch_agent, bolna_create_batch, bolna_make_call]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [bolna_get_execution_raw_logs] → sinks [bolna_create_agent, bolna_update_agent, bolna_patch_agent, bolna_create_batch, bolna_make_call]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow bolna_get_execution_raw_logs → bolna_create_agent
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "bolna_create_agent"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "bolna_create_agent" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool bolna_create_agent · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "bolna_update_agent"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "bolna_update_agent" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool bolna_update_agent · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "bolna_patch_agent"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "bolna_patch_agent" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool bolna_patch_agent · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "bolna_create_batch"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "bolna_create_batch" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool bolna_create_batch · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
medium Tool "bolna_unlink_inbound_agent" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "bolna_unlink_inbound_agent" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "unlink" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool bolna_unlink_inbound_agent
low Mutating tool "bolna_unlink_inbound_agent" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "bolna_unlink_inbound_agent" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool bolna_unlink_inbound_agent
Tools 58
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
bolna_create_agentnetwork egressbolna_create_batchnetwork egressbolna_get_execution_raw_logsingests untrusted inputbolna_make_callnetwork egressbolna_patch_agentnetwork egressbolna_unlink_inbound_agentwrites filesbolna_update_agentnetwork egressbolna_add_custom_llmno sensitive capabilitybolna_add_providerno sensitive capabilitybolna_add_sip_trunk_numberno sensitive capability
Show 48 more tools ↓
bolna_bulk_create_dispositionsno sensitive capabilitybolna_buy_phone_numberno sensitive capabilitybolna_create_dispositionno sensitive capabilitybolna_create_knowledgebaseno sensitive capabilitybolna_create_sip_trunkno sensitive capabilitybolna_create_sub_accountno sensitive capabilitybolna_delete_agentno sensitive capabilitybolna_delete_batchno sensitive capabilitybolna_delete_dispositionno sensitive capabilitybolna_delete_knowledgebaseno sensitive capabilitybolna_delete_phone_numberno sensitive capabilitybolna_delete_sip_trunkno sensitive capabilitybolna_delete_sub_accountno sensitive capabilitybolna_get_agentno sensitive capabilitybolna_get_all_sub_accounts_usageno sensitive capabilitybolna_get_batchno sensitive capabilitybolna_get_batch_executionsno sensitive capabilitybolna_get_dispositionno sensitive capabilitybolna_get_executionno sensitive capabilitybolna_get_knowledgebaseno sensitive capabilitybolna_get_sip_trunkno sensitive capabilitybolna_get_sub_account_usageno sensitive capabilitybolna_get_user_infono sensitive capabilitybolna_list_agent_executionsno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_agentsno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_batchesno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_dispositionsno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_knowledgebasesno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_phone_numbersno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_providersno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_sip_trunk_numbersno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_sip_trunksno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_sub_accountsno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_violationsno sensitive capabilitybolna_list_voicesno sensitive capabilitybolna_patch_sub_accountno sensitive capabilitybolna_remove_providerno sensitive capabilitybolna_remove_sip_trunk_numberno sensitive capabilitybolna_schedule_batchno sensitive capabilitybolna_search_phone_numbersno sensitive capabilitybolna_set_inbound_agentno sensitive capabilitybolna_stop_agent_queued_callsno sensitive capabilitybolna_stop_batchno sensitive capabilitybolna_stop_callno sensitive capabilitybolna_submit_violationno sensitive capabilitybolna_test_dispositionsno sensitive capabilitybolna_update_dispositionno sensitive capabilitybolna_update_sip_trunkno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (58 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.7 latest |
A 96/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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