Abhinavyadav Adb MCP Server
@abhinavyadav/adb-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.1
Published by @abhinavyadav — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Android Debug Bridge (ADB) — manage connected devices, run shell commands, view logcats, query SQLite databases and more.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 8 = 92. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([query_sqlite, dump_ui_hierarchy, get_app_memory, get_logcat]) and tools that can send data out ([execute_shell_command]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [query_sqlite, dump_ui_hierarchy, get_app_memory, get_logcat] → sinks [execute_shell_command]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow query_sqlite → execute_shell_command
high Tool "execute_shell_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "execute_shell_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute shell" in tool name, parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool execute_shell_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/adb-utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/adb-utils.js:28`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ponse; } }); const _child_process = require("child_process"); const _util = require("util"); const execFileAsync = (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/adb-utils.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "execute_shell_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "execute_shell_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool execute_shell_command · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "execute_shell_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "execute_shell_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool execute_shell_command
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
dump_ui_hierarchyreads sensitive dataexecute_shell_commandruns code / shellget_app_memoryreads sensitive dataget_logcatreads sensitive dataquery_sqlitereads sensitive dataclear_app_datano sensitive capabilityclear_logcatno sensitive capabilityconnect_deviceno sensitive capabilitydisconnect_deviceno sensitive capabilityexecute_raw_adbno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
force_stop_appno sensitive capabilityforward_portno sensitive capabilityget_app_usageno sensitive capabilityget_cpu_usageno sensitive capabilityget_dbinfono sensitive capabilityget_device_stateno sensitive capabilityget_dumpsysno sensitive capabilityget_propertiesno sensitive capabilityget_shared_preferencesno sensitive capabilitygrant_permissionno sensitive capabilityinstall_appno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_forwardsno sensitive capabilitylist_packagesno sensitive capabilitylist_reversesno sensitive capabilitylist_shared_preferencesno sensitive capabilitypull_fileno sensitive capabilitypush_fileno sensitive capabilityreboot_deviceno sensitive capabilityrecord_screenno sensitive capabilityreverse_portno sensitive capabilityrevoke_permissionno sensitive capabilityroot_deviceno sensitive capabilitysend_keyeventno sensitive capabilityset_mock_locationno sensitive capabilitystart_app_activityno sensitive capabilityswipe_screenno sensitive capabilitytake_screenshotno sensitive capabilitytap_screenno sensitive capabilitytype_textno sensitive capabilityuninstall_appno sensitive capabilityunroot_deviceno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 92/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @abhinavyadav/adb-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Abhinavyadav Adb 5
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 6 side by side →
MCP server for Android Debug Bridge (ADB) interactions in TypeScript
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MCP server for controlling Android devices and emulators via ADB
A server implementation for handling ADB (Android Debug Bridge) communications using the Message Control Protocol (MCP)
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