Aws Sso MCP Server
@aashari/mcp-server-aws-sso
npm
v4.0.0
Source verified
Published by aashari — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Node.js/TypeScript MCP server for AWS Single Sign-On (SSO). Enables AI systems (LLMs) with tools to initiate SSO login (device auth flow), list accounts/roles, and securely execute AWS CLI commands using temporary credentials. Streamlines AI interaction w
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "aws_sso_ec2_exec_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "aws_sso_ec2_exec_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool aws_sso_ec2_exec_command
high Tool "aws_sso_exec_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "aws_sso_exec_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool aws_sso_exec_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/services/vendor.aws.sso.exec.service.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/services/vendor.aws.sso.exec.service.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: node:util"); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const vendor_aws_sso_accounts_service_js_1 = re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/services/vendor.aws.sso.exec.service.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/aws.sso.util.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/aws.sso.util.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: DefaultAwsRegion; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); /** * Gets the default AWS region from environment
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/aws.sso.util.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/cli.test.util.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/cli.test.util.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: estUtil = void 0; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path_1 = require("path"); /** * Utility for t
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/cli.test.util.js
low Mutating tool "aws_sso_ec2_exec_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "aws_sso_ec2_exec_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool aws_sso_ec2_exec_command
low Mutating tool "aws_sso_exec_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "aws_sso_exec_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool aws_sso_exec_command
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@aashari/mcp-server-aws-sso" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/ensure-executable.js
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @aashari/mcp-server-aws-sso
Tools 5
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
aws_sso_ec2_exec_commandruns code / shellaws_sso_exec_commandruns code / shellaws_sso_loginno sensitive capabilityaws_sso_ls_accountsno sensitive capabilityaws_sso_statusno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (5 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v4.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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