Aas MCP Server
aas-mcp
PyPI
v0.0.1
Published by smartfactory-kl — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Tool "get_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "get_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool get_shell
high Tool "create_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "create_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool create_shell
high Tool "update_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "update_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool update_shell
high Tool "delete_shell" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "delete_shell" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "shell" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool delete_shell
low Mutating tool "get_shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "get_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool get_shell
low Mutating tool "create_shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "create_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool create_shell
low Mutating tool "update_shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "update_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool update_shell
low Mutating tool "delete_shell" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_shell" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_shell
Tools 25
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_shellruns code / shelldelete_shellruns code / shellget_shellruns code / shellupdate_shellruns code / shellcreate_submodelno sensitive capabilitycreate_submodel_elementno sensitive capabilitycreate_submodel_refno sensitive capabilitydelete_submodelno sensitive capabilitydelete_submodel_elementno sensitive capabilitydelete_submodel_refno sensitive capability
Show 15 more tools ↓
get_health_statusno sensitive capabilityget_shellsno sensitive capabilityget_submodelno sensitive capabilityget_submodel_elementno sensitive capabilityget_submodel_element_valueno sensitive capabilityget_submodel_elementsno sensitive capabilityget_submodel_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_submodel_refsno sensitive capabilityget_submodel_valueno sensitive capabilityget_submodelsno sensitive capabilityis_healthyno sensitive capabilityupdate_submodelno sensitive capabilityupdate_submodel_elementno sensitive capabilityupdate_submodel_element_valueno sensitive capabilityupdate_submodel_valueno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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