A2a (npm) MCP Server
a2a-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.0
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP server for Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 3.6 = 96. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −3.6 | Near-miss of exa-mcp-server MTC-SUP-005 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 96 − 5 = 91. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([a2a_get_agent_card]) co-exist with external-action tools ([a2a_send_message, a2a_get_task, a2a_get_agent_card]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [a2a_get_agent_card] → sinks [a2a_send_message, a2a_get_task, a2a_get_agent_card]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow a2a_get_agent_card → a2a_send_message
medium Near-miss of exa-mcp-server (edit distance 2)MTC-SUP-005
"a2a-mcp-server" is edit-distance 2 from the package "exa-mcp-server". Verify this is the intended package.
Fix: Confirm you meant "exa-mcp-server". Install packages only from their documented, official name.
Location: package a2a-mcp-server
Tools 4
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
a2a_get_agent_cardingests untrusted inputnetwork egressa2a_get_tasknetwork egressa2a_send_messagenetwork egressa2a_cancel_taskno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (4 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 91/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan a2a-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of A2a 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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